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ABSTRACT
It has long been understood that there is a deep connection between time and mem-
ory. From episodic memory in humans to conditioning tasks in animals, temporal
relationships play a crucial role in memory performance. While recognition memory
is a subset of episodic memory, most recognition memory models disregard informa-
tion about time and assume that memory is a composite store with a noisy record of
items and their associations. Another class of models posits that memory depends on
temporal representations in which ‘what’ and ‘when’ information is stored conjointly.
Using three experiments, I found evidence for serially accessing memory (scanning) in
both short-term and long-term memory and in predicting the future. These findings
support the hypothesis that memories are stored in temporal representations.
In Experiment 1, I hypothesized that scanning in a judgment-of-recency task is
due to a compressed temporal representation. In 107 healthy young adults, response
times depended only on the lag to the target and varied sub-linearly with lag. This
result was consistent with the hypothesis.
vii
In Experiment 2, the hypothesis was that memory search on a long-term recogni-
tion task is driven by serially scanning a compressed representation. In a continuous
recognition paradigm with 88 healthy young adults across three studies, the time at
which information starts becoming accessible varied as a function of the logarithm
of the lag. This result suggests that information in long-term memory is stored in a
compressed representation that can be accessed using a serial backward scan.
In Experiment 3, I tested the hypothesis that our ability to access what is going
to happen a few seconds in the future is similar to our ability to access the immediate
past. Sixty healthy young adults performed a relative order judgment task for future
events. The response times in this novel judgment-of-imminence task showed that a
search through prospective memory representation was serial and closely paralleled
the serial search observed in the judgment-of-recency task (Experiment 1).
Together, these results suggest that it is possible to generate a temporally ordered
representation that can be scanned to access the past and the future.
viii
Preface
This dissertation presents results from three behavioral experiments of short-term,
long-term and prospective memory. The hypotheses that have inspired this work are
based on previous modelling work that uses a neurally plausible mechanism to build a
scale invariant memory representation and provides a mechaism for predicting future
states (Shankar & Howard, 2012; Shankar, Singh, & Howard, 2016).
A brief summary of prior modeling work in recognition memory and an overview
of a newer scale invariant model of memory is presented in Chapter 1. Chapter 2
presents the results from a judgment of recency task in short term memory. This
chapter is largely based on a manuscript co-authored with Aude Oliva and Marc
Howard and is available on a pre-print server (BIORXIV/2017/101295). Chapter 3
is based on a manuscript co-authored with Marc Howard and has the results from
a long-term continuous recognition paradigm. The manuscript is also available on
bioRxiv
(BIORXIV/2017/144733). Chapter 4 presents the results from a prospective memory
task and is based on an unpublished manuscript co-authored with Marc Howard.
Chapter 5 contextualizes the results from the previous chapters and discusses some
future directions for this work.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In the famous madeleine passage from “In Search of Lost Time”, Marcel Proust recalls
a time when tasting a piece of cake brought on this profound and vivid experience
recollecting his childhood
“And once I had recognized the taste of the crumb of madeleine
soaked in her decoction of lime-flowers which my aunt used to give
me immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room
was, rose up like the scenery of a theater to attach itself to the little
pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built out behind it
for my parents...and with the house the town, from morning to night
and in all weathers, the Square, the streets along which I used to run
errands, the country roads we took when it was fine.”
Tulving (1972) coined the term episodic memory to describe this type of recollection
of specific events from one’s life, that are often accompanied by a rich and vivid expe-
rience akin to mental time travel. The fact that these recollections are accompanied
by a strong awareness of the context and sequential details of experience, alludes to
the idea that this information must be stored in a representation in the brain that
contains information about when it happened and other context details.
In the laboratory, episodic memory is usually studied using recall tasks and item
recognition tasks. In the well studied free recall task, the finding that successive
recalled items are drawn from nearby serial positions (the lag-CRP effect), shows
2evidence for encoding information in a temporal context (Kahana, 1996). In recog-
nition memory, most extant models posit that memories are stored in a scalar rep-
resentation where the information is stored in mnemonic traces (e.g., J. A. Ander-
son, 1973; Murdock, 1982; Shiffrin, Ratcliff, Murnane, & Nobel, 1993). In contrast,
other models posit that information is stored along a time conjunctive representation
(G. D. A. Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Murdock, 1974; Howard, Shankar, Aue,
& Criss, 2015). This representation places items along and internal timeline that
is temporally ordered. Thus this representation stores “what” happened along with
information about “when” it happened. As a part of the present work, results from
three recognition memory tasks in short-term, long-term and prospective memory are
presented that test the predictions from this hypothesis.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of extant models of recognition memory and the
predictions made by these models about behavior in recognition memory tasks. Chap-
ter 2 presents results from a judgment of recency task looking at relative order judg-
ments in short-term memory. Chapter 3 and 4 present results from tasks pertaining
to long term memory and prospective memory respectively.
1.1 Recognition memory
The textbook definition of recognition memory describes it as the cognitive ability
to indicate a stimulus as having been previously experienced. A common experience
associated with recognition is the feeling of familiarity, the sense of having experi-
enced the stimulus before but not being able to recollect the the exact details of the
encounter. For instance you meet someone at a party and you are sure that you’ve
seen them before but cannot remember where you’ve met them or who they are.
At a later time you are reminded that the person is someone who you know from
a different department who you met a year ago at the office Christmas party. This
3conscious experience of having a prior encounter accompanied with qualitative infor-
mation associated with the memory is called recolleciton (Yonelinas, 2002). This dual
process framework has inspired a lot of the modeling work on recognition memory.
Recollection and familiarity are believed to map onto separate underlying cognitive
processes under a dual process framework (Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal,
& King, 1996). Recollection is driven by a high threshold retrieval of information
accompanied by reinstatement of context information. Familiarity is driven by the
strength of the match with the information stored in a memory representations.
1.2 Models of recognition memory
One of the oldest attempts to model recognition memory was the application of the
signal detection framework to memory performance (Egan, 1958; Banks, 1970; Green
& Swets, 1966; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966; Murdock, 1965). Signal detection models
assume that studied items have a strength value associated with each item. This
strength varies continuously from low to high values. Most formalizations of strength
assume this to be represented by a normal distribution across the items that have
been experienced in the task (old items). Another normal distribution represents the
new items. These two distributions overlap and a participant uses a decision threshold
to discriminate between old and new items (see Figure 1·1). Items whose familiarity
exceeds this threshold are responded to as “Old” and if the familiarity is less that
this threshold, the response is “New”. The overlap between the strengths of the old
and new items is what drives the false alarms and the misses. If the familiarity of
an old item is below the decision threshold, the participant will incorrectly respond
“New”. If the strength of a new item is above the decision threshold, the participant
will make a false alarm and respond “Old”.
The exact mechanism of building a representation to store items and the process
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Figure 1·1: Signal detection framework The familiarity signal
associated with old and new items varies along a continuum and is
modeled by two normal distributions. New and old items are stored
with different strength and participants make a response based on the
a decision threshold. If the value is to the right of the decision threshold,
participants respond ‘Old’ else they respond ‘New’.
5to search through this representation in order to drive a decision process has received
considerable interest and a wide variety of models and frameworks have been devel-
oped such as TODAM - the theory of distributed associative memory (Murdock, 1982;
Murdock, Smith, & Bai, 2001), SAM - search of associative memory (Raaijmakers &
Shiffrin, 1980; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984), CHARM - composite holographic associative
recall model (Metcalfe-Eich, 1982), MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 1984), EBRW - Exem-
plar Based Random Walk (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1998; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese,
1999; Nosofsky, Little, Donkin, & Fific, 2011).
1.3 Modeling response times
A signal detection theory model of a recognition memory task can be used to account
for the observed response probabilities. However in addition to measures of accuracy,
response times are an important dependent measure. Various models have tried to
account for the response times obtained in tasks of recognition memory. A lot of
work around modeling response times is linked to sequential sampling models such
as the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Ratcliff &
McKoon, 2008). The drift diffusion model provides a rich framework for studying a
variety of cognitive tasks and processes. In this framework, information is accumu-
lated in the presence of noise over a period of time. When the accumulator value
reaches a threshold, a response is made. A large body of work has shown that the
parameters in this model have interpretive power in terms of underlying cognitive
processes (Ratcliff, 2002; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). The rate of information
accumulation per unit time is called drift rate and reflects the quality of information
available to the accumulator (Ratcliff, 1978). The distance to the boundary and the
starting point have been interpreted as the level of conservatism and the bias for
a particular response (Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012).
6The non-decision time parameter in this model captures the time spent before the
accumulator starts or after the accumulator has reached a bound. It has tradition-
ally been used to account for motor processes that are not related to the decision
making process. The memory strength for a particular item is akin to the quality
of the information that drives the drift diffusion process. Hence, it is common to
model changes in strength obtained in a memory search in terms of a change the drift
rate in recognition memory models (Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Ratcliff, Van Zandt, &
McKoon, 1999; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Under an alternative model such as a
serial search over an ordered representation, it is possible that the non-decision time
captures the time it takes to access to the portion of the representation that has the
target information that can then drive the accumulator.
Another approach to modeling response times is to fit a known distribution and
estimate the parameters of the distribution to make inferences about the underlying
process. A common observation across cognitive tasks is that response times are right
skewed. The ex-Gaussian distribution is often used to fit RT data. It is the convo-
lution of a normal and an an exponential distribution and can fit an RT distribution
using three parameters, two for the normal compornent and one for the exponential
component (Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976). Other distributions with the characteris-
tic right skew have been used to fit RT data. The choice of which distribution to
use for a particular scenario depends on the nature of the task being modeled. For
instance, a shifted Wald distribution has also been used to fit response time distri-
butions (Schwarz, 2001; Heathcote, 2004). The Wald distribution is the solution to
the drift diffusion process with one absorbing boundary (Wald, 1947). Thus this
distribution is the right one to use in case the task requires a “go/no-go” response.
7Figure 1·2: Drift diffusion model The information is accumulated
in the presence of noise to a criterion. The drift rate determines the
speed at which the accumulator is driven to the decision boundary.
Image reproduced from (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) with permission.
1.4 Serial vs. Parallel search
In his seminal work on using response times to make inferences about mental pro-
cesses, Donders proposed the subtraction method. If the mean response times from
two tasks require all the same hypothesized stages of processing except one, the dif-
ferences in the response times must be attributable to the time it takes to complete
the processes for the additional stage (Donders, 1969/1868). This method has various
limitations. Most notably, the hypothesized stages were mostly derived by introspec-
tion. However this idea of additivity in response times due to a parametric change
in the memory search load was later applied to models of memory search (Sternberg,
1969a). This inspired a series of influential experiments in recognition memory such
as the classic Sternberg task (Sternberg, 1966, 1969b). In this task, participants were
shown a sets of letters with varying sets sizes. After an interval, they were asked to
report whether a probe was present on the list. Sometimes the probe item was on the
list (positive probe) and other times it wasn’t (negative probe). The response times
were found to increase systematically with the set size. However, what was surprising
8was that the slope of the response time as a function of set size was same for both
positive and negative probes. Sternberg used the linear change in response times to
argue for a serial search process. The finding that the slope remained the same for
positive and negative probes was used to make a distinction between self-terminating
and exhaustive models. A self-terminating search makes the prediction that the slope
of the RT with set size for the positive sets and the negative sets would be different
since the search will terminate when a match is found and on average positive sets
require half as many comparisons. Under an exhaustive search model, the prediction
is that the slope of the response times with lag is same for both positive and negative
sets. Sternberg concluded that the predictions from serial exhaustive search models
could explain the observed response times in short-term recognition tasks. The in-
crease in the response time with set size was hypothesized to be due to additional
memory comparisons (Sternberg, 1969a).
At the time linear RTs were considered to be a hallmark prediction of serial
access models and parallel models were typically associated with response times that
varied sub-linearly with the lag. Later Donkin and Nosofsky (2012b) showed that the
response times in the Sternberg task can also be explained by a parallel-access model
particularly when rapid presentation rates were used. Response times in the Sternberg
task with slower presentation rates were more consistent with the predictions of a
global familiarity or parallel access model. It was also shown that parallel models
can explain the findings in the Sternberg task using an exemplar based random walk
model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1998; Nosofsky et al., 2011). In exemplar based random
walk models, the model framework proposes that each item in a list is stored as
an individual exemplar. When a probe is presented, the exemplars are retrieved
based on the similarity with the probe and memory strength for the item. This
retrieved exemplar can then drive a drift diffusion process towards an old/new decision
9threshold.
Historically most of the attention in memory search has been devoted to short-
term memory tasks. Nosofsky, Cox, Cao, and Shiffrin (2014) used a variant of the
exemplar based random walk model and applied it to both short and long term
memory and found that the response times were well characterized by a a logarithmic
function. It should be noted that this model used a pure strength based account of
the underlying memory representation to predict the pattern of response times.
To conclude, parallel and serial models with sufficient extensions, can both predict
many the properties seen in the responses in recognition memory tasks. However
for a serial access to be possible, the underlying representation must be ordered.
The internal representation that was proposed in Howard et al. (2015) allows for a
serial search over information stored in short term and long term memory. Serial
models impose a more stringent requirement in terms of the nature of the underlying
representation. It is worth noting that an ordered representation can be accessed in
parallel depending on task demands. Thus an ordered representation supports the
possibility of there being both a serial and a parallel access mechanism but in the
absence of such an ordered representation a serial access is not possible.
1.5 Role of time in memory
The recency effect in memory is the tendency for better performance on more recent
items than less recent items. This manifests itself as an improvement in accuracy
and faster response times for more recent items. Various tasks in recognition memory
have reported a recency effect (Monsell, 1978; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976; Hockley,
1982; Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012b). The most common finding from these tasks is that
the response time varies as a function of the set size of items held in memory. There
is also evidence for serial position effects where the response time depends specifically
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on the lag of the probed item in memory. 
In a variant of the Sternberg task with longer lists from two to twenty words, Burrows 
and Okada (1975) found similar results as the Sternberg task in terms of positive and 
negative probes; the slopes did not change across the two conditions. But the novel finding 
was that the slope did not remain the same across the entire range of list lengths from two 
to twenty. The authors offered two accounts of the response times; one described by a 
logarithmic function and another by a bilinear function of the response times. However 
both these accounts show that the response times varied as a sub-linear function of the list 
length. 
In addition to the recency effect, another attribute of memory tasks is the contiguity 
effect. Temporal contiguity effect refers to the finding that items experienced closer 
together in time are recalled closer to each other. In free recall, the recall of an item is 
followed by the recall of another from close by in the list (Kahana, 1996; Howard & 
Kahana, 1999). Similar contiguity effects have also been reported in recognition memory 
(G. Schwartz, Howard, Jing, & Kahana, 2005). Exemplar based models rely on a 
representation that is purely driven by memory strength. This fails to readily explain 
temporal contiguity effects in recognition memory. 
Elsewhere, time has been argued to be an integral aspect of memories (G. D. A. 
Brown, Vousden, & McCormack, 2009; G. D. A. Brown, Morin, & Lewandowsky, 2006). 
Time is closely confounded with the number of items in most of these tasks. However there 
is some evidence from experiments where the presentation rate was manipulated that 
supports the hypothesis that response times depend on time and not the number of times 
(Hintzman, 2004). These results together support the hypothesis that time plays an 
important role in recognition memory. 
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1.6 Memory and scale invariance
The Weber-Fechner law relates the magnitude of a physical stimulus with the per-
ceived psychophysical strength (Fechner, 1860/1912). This relationship depends on
the relative change in the magnitude of the physical stimulus. For instance, the per-
ceived difference in weights of 100g and 110g is the same as the perceived difference in
the weights of 1000g and 1100g. Even though the absolute difference in weights is 10g
and 100g respectively, they are perceived to be the same because the relative change
is 10g/100g and 100g/1000g is the same. This function is known to well describe
the perception of various physical quantities such as luminance, loudness, numerosity
judgments etc. Based on the pervasiveness of this relationship in various cognitive
domains, it has been proposed as a possible universal property of cognition (Chater
& Brown, 2008; Howard & Shankar, in press; Merzenich, Knight, & Roth, 1973;
E. L. Schwartz, 1977; Nieder & Miller, 2003; Harvey, Klein, Petridou, & Dumoulin,
2013; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Balsam & Gallistel, 2009).
In tasks of recognition memory, there has been some evidence of Weber-Fechner
scaling in absolute judgment of recency tasks. In this paradigm, participants are
presented with a list one item at a time and at the end asked to provide a numerical
estimate of how long ago a probe item was presented. The rated recency of the
probe varies as a negatively accelerating function of actual recency. The mean judged
recency can be well described by Weber Fechner function (Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968).
The Weber-Fechner relationship has also been observed in learning tasks with
animals. In an appetitive conditioning paradigm, Gallistel and Gibbon (2000) showed
that the number of trials required for the acquisition of the CR depends on the ratio
of the inter-trial interval to the delay of reinforcement. Thus the number of trials
required to acquire the CR when the CS-US delay is 5 seconds is the same as the
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number of trials required when the delay is 15 seconds provided the inter-trial interval
is appropriately adjusted to the same scale. Thus there is no characteristic scale for
associative learning (Balsam & Gallistel, 2009).
This body of work seems to suggest that scale invariant timing has been observed
in a variety of tasks and is an organizing principle for storing memories (Gibbon,
1977; Rakitin et al., 1998; Miall, 1989; Kello et al., 2010; J. Anderson & Schooler,
1991; Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001).
1.7 Building a scale invariant representation of the past
The degradation in memory performance with time has been described by a scale-
invariant power law function (Wixted, 2004). However most models of recognition
memory are based on a scalar match of stimulus strength that does not take into
account scale invariance of timing information for matching stimuli. A recent model
of memory relies on a two-layer feed forward network that can be used to build a
scale invariant representation of the past (Shankar & Howard, 2012). Using this rep-
resentation, the performance in a wide variety of behavioral tasks has been simulated
(Howard et al., 2015). The first layer of this two layer network consists of a series
of persistently firing cells with different decay constants (see Figure 1·3a). This layer
is referred to as the t-layer. An input stimulus causes the activation of all the cells
in this layer to increase and then decay with different decay constants (Figure 1·3b).
This transformation of the input information into a set of cells with different decay
constants encodes the Laplace transform of the stimulus history. Recent work has
shown the neural plausibility of implementing this layer using cells with long time
constants (Tiganj, Hasselmo, & Howard, 2015).
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a
b
Figure 1·3: Two layer feedforward model framework for build-
ing a time conjunctive representation a. The two-layer feedfor-
ward network encodes the stimulus f(τ) into a series of leaky integrators
in the t-layer. Each node in the t-layer has a different decay rate s. This
transformation from the signal to t-layer is akin to taking the Laplace
transform of the input signal. The activity of the nodes in t-layer drives
the activity in the time cells of the T-layer through a filter L-1k . T-layer
contains a scale-invariant representation of stimulus history. b. The
input signal f(τ) is transformed into a set of exponentially decaying
signals in t(τ, s) with different decay constants. The T-layer has cells
respond after a certain delay (time-cells).
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dt(τ, s)
dτ
= −st(τ, s) + f(τ) (1.1)
t(τ, s) =
τ∫
−∞
f(τ
′
)es(τ
′−τ) (1.2)
The activity of the cells in this layer can be used to drive the output of the cells
in the T-layer. The T-layer turns the pattern of activity across the cells in t-layer
into “time cell”. The cells in the T-layer have a characteristic temporal window of
response and each of these cell shows activity at different timescales ranging from a
few hundred milliseconds to minutes.
Figure 1·4 illustrates how a simplified implementation of this framework can be
used to transform the activation in the t-layer (using cells with different decay con-
stants) into “time cells” in T- layer. A stimulus that appear at time t = 0 drives the
activity of the cells in t-layer to a peak and they decay at different rates. The cells
in the t-layer are arranged according to their time constants. Consider two adjacent
t-layer cells with rapidly decaying time constants (Figure 1·4a). If the activity of
these two cells is subtracted from each other, the difference in activity between these
two cells reaches a peak sooner (around 600ms). In Figure 1·4b, using a different
set of cells from the t-layer with slower time constants, the difference in the activity
reaches a peak at a later time (around 1200ms). Thus the activity of a T-layer cell
indicates how long ago a stimulus was presented. A series of such cells can be used
to build a representation of “what” happened “when”.
In this model, the transformation of the activity in the t-layer to the activity in
T-layer is achieved using the L-1k operator. The k represents the order of the derivative
across the cells in the t-layer. In the illustration above, the difference between the two
cells was taken. This is akin to setting k = 1. The value of k controls the precision
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Figure 1·4: Illustration simulating the response of a T-layer
cell from two t-layer cells a. When the small t cells decay fast, the
difference between the the cells reaches a peak soon and has an overall
narrower width. The difference between the green and the blue line
reaches a maxima sooner than the cells in the following panel b. The
exponentially decaying cells with long time constants decay slower and
the difference between their activation reaches a peak at a later time
and has a wider window during which they are active.
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of the temporal windows in the T-layer and in practice is set at a higher value.
T (τ,
∗
τ) =
[
L-1k
]
t(τ, s) (1.3)
This transformation from the activity in t-layer to activity in T-layer is a numerical
approximation of the inverse Laplace transform (Post, 1930). A key attribute of this
inversion is that the the precision of the reconstructed stimulus history goes down
with lag of the stimulus. Thus items that are further in the past are reproduced
with lower precision. This representation of timing information is scale invariant
and can naturally give rise to the scale invariant properties observed in behavioral
tasks. Recent work has shown that the L-1k operator can be periodically modulated
to generate predictions about future states (Shankar et al., 2016).
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Chapter 2
Recency order judgments suggest a
compressed temporal representation in
short term memory
In a relative judgment of recency (JOR) task participants choose which of two probes
from a list was presented more recently. Recency in this task is traditionally measured
in units of lag, which is the number of time steps in the past at which the probe was
presented. That is, if the last item in the list was presented as a probe, it would
be associated with a lag of one. The classic finding from short-term relative JOR
tasks is that correct response time (RT) depends on the lag to the more recent item
but not to the less recent item (see Fig. 2·1, Muter, 1979; Hacker, 1980; Hockley,
1984). For decades, researchers have argued that this finding is consistent with a
self-terminating backward scan (Muter, 1979; Hacker, 1980; Hockley, 1984; McElree
& Dosher, 1993). Because the scan starts at the present and proceeds backwards in
time, RTs show a recency effect. Because the scan is self-terminating this naturally
accounts for the finding that correct RTs do not depend on the lag of the less-recent
probe. This account also naturally explains the finding that incorrect RTs depend on
the lag to the (incorrectly) selected probe item.
A backward scanning model implies that memory for the list is organized along
a temporal axis; in order for memory to be sequentially “scanned” it must be orga-
nized in some way. Recently, this finding has taken on new theoretical importance,
18
with some authors arguing that many different forms of memory could be supported
by different operations on a temporally-organized memory (Howard et al., 2015).
This places additional explanatory importance on the null effect of lag to the less
recent probe. Moreover, this theoretical proposal argues that the temporal dimen-
sion should be compressed, consistent with longstanding arguments about memory
(G. D. A. Brown et al., 2007; Balsam & Gallistel, 2009). A serial scan of a compressed
temporal representation should result in a sublinear increase in RTs, rather than a
linear increase in RTs as one would expect from scanning of an uncompressed repre-
sentation of time. Although previous results are consistent with a sublinear increase
in RT with lag (see e.g., Fig. 7 of Hockley, 1984, Fig. 5 Hacker, 1980) this was not
statistically evaluated in those prior studies.
This study describes findings from a short-term JOR task very similar to the
procedure used in (Hacker, 1980). To anticipate the results, the findings support
the results of the classic papers with modern statistics—I will argue that correct
response time does not depend on the lag to the less-recent item as evaluated using
a Bayesian t-test. In addition, it was found that the response time is a sub-linear
function of lag to the more recent item. This finding is as predicted by scanning of a
compressed representation. If performance in the JOR task results from scanning of
a temporal representation of the past, the sublinear increase in RT suggests that this
representation is compressed along the temporal axis.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Procedure
The procedure of this experiment follows the procedure of Experiment 2 of Hacker
(1980) closely. The procedures are described in detail here, noting differences between
this experiment and prior work where relevant. Participants were presented with a list
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Figure 2·1: Schematic of the judgment of recency (JOR) task.
a. The participants are shown a list of letters followed by a probe
containing two letters from the list. The participants are required to
choose the more recent of the two probe items. b. The lag combinations
in this task. The most recent lag, lag 1 can be paired with a less recent
probe from six possible lags, lags 2 through 6. This is represented by
the darkest line. The shading represents the lag to the more recent item
and the less recent item is plotted on the x-axis. The red box indicates
the probed lag in the schematic on the left. This shading convention
is followed in the subsequent plots where both the less and the more
recent lags are included on the same graph.
of 9, 11, or 13 consonants at the rate of 5.5 letters per second. At the end of the list,
two of the last seven letters were chosen randomly and the participants were asked
to indicate using left or right arrow key which of the two letters had appeared more
recently. In Figure 2·1, G and T are presented as the probe items. Because G was
presented more recently than T, the correct answer is G. In addition, participants
were asked to respond with the up arrow key if they did not remember seeing either
of the probe letters on the list. If the participant did not make a response within 6 s,
the trial was terminated. Less than .004 of trials terminated without a response.
The distance to the more recent probe stimulus was varied from lag 1 (the last
stimulus in the list) to 6. The lag to the less recent probe was varied from 2 to 7.
This leads to 21 possible lag combinations, which were presented in a random order.
Each participant completed 320 trials.
There are several methodological differences between this procedure and the pro-
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cedure of Experiment 2 of Hacker (1980). Unlike the Hacker (1980) study, in this
experiment participants were never given foils that did not appear in the list. Also,
in the Hacker (1980) study participants were not given the option to respond indicat-
ing that they did not remember either of the probes. The participants in the Hacker
(1980) study were also more experienced in the task, experiencing a variety of pre-
sentation rates over several experimental sessions. In this experiment, participants
received only one presentation rate in one session lasting about forty minutes.
2.1.2 Participants
The participants that participated in the study were drawn from the participant
pool for Boston University’s introductory psychology class. The study materials and
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Boston University. 108
participants signed up for the study. One participant withdrew from the experiment.
Data from 11 participants was excluded because their overall accuracy across all lags
was no better than chance. Data from the remaining 96 participants was analyzed
using R.
2.2 Results
The trials on which participants selected neither of the probes, are referred to here
as “abstain” responses. The probability of a trial ending in an “abstain” response
is .17 ± .02. The overall median RT for the abstain responses was 1.5 ± .2s. This
was slower than the median response time in the slowest condition (lag 6) for both
the correct and incorrect choices (t(187) = −2.2, p < 0.05). These abstain trials are
excluded from the subsequent analyses. The accuracy and response time calculations
that follow are calculated based on the trials on which the participant made a choice.
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2.2.1 Strategy for analyzing the two lag variables
The analyses that follow consider the effect of two variables, lag to the more recent
probe and lag to the less recent probe. In many cases, the effect of one or more of
these variables is clearly non-linear. Simply putting both lags into a linear model
under these circumstances would raise the possibility that a spurious effect of one lag
would result from an attempt to account for residuals of the other lag. Moreover,
because of the definition of lag, the values of the two lag variables covary (note that
the lines in Fig. 2·1b are of different lengths). The probe at the more recent lag was
compared to the probe at lags further in in the past. For each more recent lag, there
is a variable number of less recent lags. In order to control for the effect of unequal
number of combinations, a two stage analysis strategy was adopted.
First, I take the less salient of the two variables and compute a distance effect
for that variable. If that distance effect is different from zero (as assessed by a
Bayesian t-test), that variable is allowed to enter into a linear mixed effect analysis.
In cases where the distance effect is not reliable, the function of the linear mixed
effect analysis is simply to determine whether the apparent effect of the more salient
variable is statistically reliable.
To be more concrete, faced with data that looks like Figure 2·1b, I would, for
each value of the more recent lag (the different lines in Fig. 2·1b), compute the slope
with respect to the lag to the less recent probe for each participant. If evidence was
found that the distance effect was zero (as assessed with a Bayesian t-test (Rouder,
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009)) it was not included as a factor in a linear
mixed effect analysis. The purpose of this analysis would simply be to confirm that
there is an effect of the lag to the more recent probe. This strategy applies to both
analyses of accuracy and correct RTs. In the case of error RTs, the salience of the
two lags is reversed, consistent with prior results (Hacker, 1980).
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2.2.2 Accuracy depended on both the lag to the more recent probe and
the lag to the less recent probe
The probability that participants selected the more recent probe was .70± 0.01. The
accuracy was .82± .01 when the lag of the more recent probe was 1 and dropped to
.49 ± .02 when the lag to the more recent lag was six. At lag 6 the probability of
choosing the more recent probe was not different from chance (Chi-squared prop test,
χ2(96) = 89.1, p-value not significant). Lag 5 had an accuracy of 0.56± 0.1 and was
significantly higher than chance (Chi-squared prop test, χ2(96) = 142.6, p < 0.01).
Accuracy monotonically increased at lower lags and was also significantly higher than
chance.
Accuracy also depended on both the lag to the more recent probe and the lag
to the less recent probe. For a given lag to the more recent probe, the accuracy
improved as the lag to the less recent probe increased (distance effect). The upward-
sloping lines in Figure 2·2a indicate the presence of a distance effect. To quantify the
distance effect for each participant, I calculated the slope of each line in Figure 2·2a.
A Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al., 2009) on the obtained slopes revealed “decisive
evidence” (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Jeffreys, 1998)
favoring the hypothesis that the slopes are different from 0 (JZS Bayes Factor > 102).
The effects of the two lags on accuracy was quantified using a linear mixed analysis
with independent intercepts for each participant. The accuracy decreased with an
increase in the lag to the more recent probe by .078± .002, t(1918) = −31.9, p < 0.01
per unit change in lag. Accuracy also increased with the lag to the less recent probe
by .023 ± .002, t(1918) = 9.73, p < 0.01 per unit change in the lag. These findings
are consistent with the findings from prior studies.
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Figure 2·2: Accuracy, correct RT and incorrect RT are plotted
as a function of the lag to the less recent probe. Different lines
represent different values of the lag to the more recent probe. (darker
lines correspond to more recent lags). a. Accuracy depends on the lag
to the more recent item and also shows a weak distance effect (note
that the lines are not flat). b. Correct RT depends strongly on the
lag to the more recent probe. The flat lines suggest that there was
not an effect of the lag to the less recent probe (see text for details).
c. Incorrect RT for incorrect responses depends on the lag to the less
recent probe, but at most weakly on the lag to the more recent probe
(see text for details).
2.2.3 Correct response time depended strongly on the lag to the more
recent probe but not on the lag to the less recent probe
The response times for the correct responses depended strongly on the more recent
lag as seen in Figure 2·2b. The median response time varied from .72 ± .02 s for
the most recent lag to 1.36± .06 s for a lag of six. In contrast to the distance effect
seen in accuracy Figure 2·2a, the lines in Figure 2·2b appear to be flat. In order to
assess this distance effect more directly, I calculated the slopes of lines in Figure 2·2b
separately for each participant and performed a Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al., 2009)
on the slopes. This analysis showed “substantial evidence” (Wetzels & Wagenmakers,
2012; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Jeffreys, 1998) favoring the hypothesis that the slopes
are not different from 0 (JZS Bayes Factor = 3.3). A linear mixed effects analysis
allowing for independent intercepts for each participant showed a significant effect
of the lag to the more recent probe, .124 ± .006 s, t(478) = 21.6, p < 0.001. These
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Figure 2·3: Response time varies sub-linearly with lag. a.
Median RT plotted as a function of the lag to the chosen item. In
case of correct responses this is the lag to the more recent item and
in case of errors this is the lag to the less recent item. b. Median
RT plotted as a function of the log of the lag to the chosen item.
The median response times are well described by a straight line on
a log scale. c. Schematic of the underlying memory representation
inferred from the results obtained in the experiment. The accuracy
goes down with the lag to the more recent item and this is represented
as change in the strength (smaller sized letters). The spacing between
the lines is foreshortened to indicate compression in the underlying
memory representations.
results replicate prior studies, but extend them by establishing positive evidence for
the null using the Bayesian t-test.
2.2.4 Response time varies sub-linearly by lag to the more recent item
Figure 2·2b suggests that correct RTs depended prominently on the lag to the more
recent item. Further it appears that the spacing between these lines goes down as
the lag increases. This suggests that the RT depends sub-linearly on the lag to the
more recent probe, as predicted by a backward self-terminating scanning model that
scans along a temporally-compressed representation.
In order to evaluate whether scanning times depended on lag to the more recent
probe in a sublinear fashion, the two models were compared. In one model, RT was
regressed onto the more recent lag. In the other RT was regressed onto the logarithm
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results replicate prior studies, but extend them by establishing positive evidence for
the null using the Bayesian t-test.
2.2.4 Response time varies sub-linearly by lag to the more recent item
Figure 2·2b sugg sts that correct RTs depe ded prominently on the lag to the more
recent item. Further it appears that the spacing between these lines goes down as
the lag increases. This suggests that the RT depends sub-linearly on the lag to the
more recent probe, as predicted by a backward self-terminating scanning model that
scans along a temporally-compressed representation.
In order to evaluate whether scanning times depended on lag to the more recent
probe in a sublinear fashion, the two models were compared. In one model, RT was
regressed onto the more recent lag. In the other RT was regressed onto the logarithm
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of the more recent lag. The log model fit better than the linear model, ∆AIC = 4.1
(log model is 60.34 times more likely as compared to the linear model). A linear
mixed effects analysis allowing for independent intercepts for each participant showed
a significant effect of the log2 lag to the more recent probe, .24± .01 s, t(478) = 21.74,
p < 0.001.
As an additional test for sublinearity the linear model was compared to polynomial
models with various powers of lag to the more recent probe. A quadratic model
fit better than the linear model ∆AIC = 3.7. The quadratic term had a negative
regression coefficient−0.6±0.2, t(477) = −2.6, p < 0.01. Including higher order terms
did not further improve the fit. Consistent with the conclusions of the logarithmic
analysis reported above, both approaches found evidence that the effect the lag to
the more recent probe on correct RT was sublinear.
The finding of sublinearity is visually consistent with prior studies (Hacker, 1980;
Hockley, 1984). However to my knowledge it had not previously been statistically
evaluated.
2.2.5 Incorrect response time depended strongly on the lag to the less
recent probe
In a self-terminating backward scanning model, if the scan misses the more recent
probe, it would then terminate on the less recent probe. These responses would be
errors and the scanning time for these errors would depend on the lag to the less
recent probe.
Given the overall error rate of .30 ± 0.01, there are less than half the number
of observations for incorrect RTs as there are for correct RTs. Also note that the
number of errors is not evenly distributed over lags, so that some points in Figure 2·2c
have many fewer observations than others. Nonetheless, error RTs appear to depend
26
reliably on the lag to the less recent item (note that all the lines increase from left
to right). There does not appear to be a strong effect of the lag to the more recent
probe (note that the different lines tend to lie on top of one another).
To evaluate whether there was an effect of the lag to the more recent probe I
calculated the slope of the distance effect for each value of the lag to the less recent
probe. This is analogous to the distance effect calculation for correct RTs except
the distance effect is calculated separately for the lag to the less recent probe rather
than the more recent probe. That is, for errors I computed a slope for each cluster of
points in Figure 2·2c rather than across each line. A Bayesian t-test showed “strong
evidence” (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Jeffreys, 1998)
favoring the hypothesis that the slopes of the median response times as a function of
the more recent lag are not different from 0 (JZS Bayes Factor = 14.5).
A linear mixed effects analysis, allowing each participant to have an independent
intercept, and the less recent lag as regressor showed a significant effect of the lag to
the less recent probe on the median response time of incorrect responses, .033±.007 s,
t(473) = 4.9, p < 0.001.
2.3 Discussion
This study replicated the classical finding in a relative JOR task that correct RT
depends on the lag to the more recent probe but not on the lag to the less recent
probe (Fig. 2·2b). Beyond simply failing to observe a positive effect, a Bayesian t-
test found substantial evidence that there was no effect of the less recent probe on
correct RT. In contrast to the findings for correct RTs, the pattern was reversed for
error RTs. For error RTs, the lag to the less recent probe showed a robust effect,
while a Bayesian t-test found strong evidence that there was no effect of lag to the
more recent probe (Fig. 2·2c). For both correct and error RTs, the lag to the probe
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stimulus that was selected had a large effect on RT whereas the lag to the probe that
was not selected did not have an effect on RT.
Scanning models posit that order information for the items in memory drives ac-
cess, such as in conveyor belt models of memory (Murdock, 1974). The dependence of
RT on only the lag of the selected stimulus is a strong prediction of a self-terminating
scanning model. In contrast, strength-based models predict a distance effect on RTs
in a relative JOR task, i.e. RT should depend on both lags. Although there is not a
distance effect on correct RT, there is a distance effect on accuracy. Scanning models
have addressed this by assuming that the probability of the search terminating when
a probe is encountered goes down with increasing lag (Hacker, 1980; Howard et al.,
2015).
This paper also showed that the effect of lag to the more recent probe on correct
RT was sublinear (Fig. 2·3). This is a prediction of the hypothesis of a model in
which the self-terminating search scans over a compressed temporal representaiton
(Howard et al., 2015). This result is also consistent with other conceptions of the
scanning process as well. For instance the model presented in Hacker (1980) assumes
that list stimuli are associated with an availability that falls off with increasing lag.
The amount of time to scan a list stimulus is a function of its availability. Because
availability decreases, the scanning rate appears to accelerate as one proceeds towards
the past.
2.3.1 Is scanning under strategic control?
A scanning model implies that the brain maintains some representation organized
such that attention can be sequentially deployed along a temporal dimension. This
naturally leads to the question of whether that deployment of attention is under
strategic control or not. The scanning rate one would infer from the present results
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is such that one can scan a few seconds into the past in about one second of search
time. The relative slowness of this putative scan relative to other cognitive processes
suggests it could be under strategic control.
Additional evidence suggesting that scanning is under strategic control comes from
a variant on the relative JOR task in which the instructions are reversed. Chan, Ross,
Earle, and Caplan (2009) had participants perform either a JOR task or a relative
order judgment in which they were asked to select the probe stimulus that appeared
earlier in the list. Unsurprisingly, their JOR task replicated the canonical results from
relative JOR, with correct RTs failing to show an effect of the lag to the less recent
probe, consistent with a backward self-terminating scanning model. Remarkably,
however, when the instructions were reversed the pattern of results for correct RTs
was consistent with a forward self-terminating scanning model (see also Liu, Chan,
& Caplan, 2014). This suggests that a temporally-organized representation can be
accessed strategically.
2.3.2 Relationship to other JOR tasks over longer time scales
In addition to the short-term relative JOR task studied here, investigators have stud-
ied recency judgments using a variety of similar methodologies. Yntema and Trask
(1963) first introduced the relative JOR task as a continuous judgment in which a
stream of stimuli was occasionally interupted by a pair of probes. They examined a
much wider range of lags than in the short lists used here. The standard finding from
continuous JORs is that accuracy decreases, all else equal, as the distance between
the two probes decreases and as the lag to the more recent probe increases. These
findings are broadly consistent with the changes in accuracy observed in relative JOR
on short lists of stimuli (such as this study).
In studies of absolute JOR, participants rate the distance to the probe numerically
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(Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968; Hinrichs, 1970; Hintzman, 2010; Hacker, 1980). The
canonical findings from absolute JORs are 1) that the variability in ratings increases
for probes further in the past and 2) participants’ ratings for the lag of a probe
decreases sublinearly with the actual lag of the probe. (Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968)
argued that a logarithmic function relates rated lag to actual lag. Notably, when a
probe stimulus was presented multiple times in the past, participants can rate the
separate occurrences nearly independently. Hintzman (2010) presented stimuli three
times, P1, P2 and P3. Participants rated the recency of the most recent presentation
at both P2 and at P3. The key finding was that ratings at P3 depended a great deal
on the lag between P2 and P3, but very little on the lag between P1 and P2 (see also
Flexser & Bower, 1974).
2.3.3 A common model for JORs across scales?
While none of the findings discussed here is sufficient in isolation to argue for a mem-
ory representation that utilizes temporal ordering (Friedman, 1993), it is worth noting
that all of these findings can be explained using the same model (Howard et al., 2015).
Suppose first that all of the tasks described rely on a logarithmically-compressed time-
line. In this representation, past experience is represented along a timeline. Consis-
tent with the Fechner law, the time axis is logarithmically compressed, resulting in a
scale-invariant representation (Chater & Brown, 2008; G. D. A. Brown et al., 2007).
This property allows behavioral models to exhibit similar properties over time scales
ranging from a few seconds (e.g., this study Hacker, 1980) up to many minutes (e.g.,
Yntema & Trask, 1963). A backward self-terminating scan over a timeline with these
properties would naturally lead to the results in this paper, including the sublinear
function relating correct RT to the lag to the more recent probe (Fig. 2·3).
However, the results from continuous JOR and absolute JORs over longer time
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scales are also at least roughly consistent with this model (for detailed models see
Howard et al., 2015). For instance, the logarithmic function relating judged lag to
actual lag is a natural consequence of logarithmic compression. Similarly, the minimal
dependence of judged recency on previous presentations of a stimulus (Hintzman,
2010) is a natural consequence of a backward self-terminating model. The forward
scanning results (Chan et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2014) could result from recovery of
the temporal context at the start of the list (Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi,
Haarmann, & Usher, 2005) followed by a forward scan using a translation operator
(Shankar et al., 2016). The major gap in reconciling short-term (this study, Muter,
1979; Hacker, 1980; Hockley, 1984; McElree & Dosher, 1993) and long-term (Hinrichs
& Buschke, 1968; Hintzman, 2010; Yntema & Trask, 1963) JORs is the lack of RT
data for judgments over scales more than a few seconds.
2.4 Conclusions
This study examined response times and accuracy in short-term JOR tasks. The
classic results from the short-term JOR task were replicated and extended. Whereas
accuracy showed a distance effect, both correct and error RTs depended only on the
lag to the probe stimulus that was chosen. Bayesian analyses showed positive evidence
for a null effect of the lag to the probe that was not chosen. Moreover, the increase
in correct RT was a sublinear function of the lag to the more recent probe. These
findings are consistent with a backward self-terminating scanning model in which the
participant scans over a logarithmically-compressed representation of the past.
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Chapter 3
Scanning in long term memory
In recognition memory experiments participants must determine whether a probe
stimulus has been previously experienced or not. As the recency of a repeated probe
decreases, the accuracy of the judgment decreases and response time (RT) increases
(Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012a; Hockley, 1982; Monsell, 1978; Murdock & Anderson,
1975; Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961). Despite decades of empirical and modeling
work, it remains unclear what changes in the state of memory cause the recency
effect in recognition memory.
In continuous recognition, an item is presented at each time step; the partici-
pant indicates whether it was previously experienced. Because previously-experienced
items must be identified from a stream of information, continuous recognition is some-
what similar to the experience of memory in the real world. Consider the task of an
individual engaged in continuous recognition (Figure 3·1a). In order to correctly
identify an item as old, one must compare it to the contents of their memory. In con-
tinuous recognition, the recency effect manifests as a sublinear increase in RT with
increasing lag of the repeated probe (Hintzman, 1969; Hockley, 1982; Okada, 1971);
Hockley (1982) found a logarithmic increase in RT with increasing lag. Why does it
take longer to retrieve memories from further in the past?
Many distributed memory models assume that memory is a composite store con-
taining a noisy record of features from all the studied items (e.g., J. A. Anderson,
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Figure 3·1: Two forms of memory representations that ac-
count for the recency effect. a. Schematic of a continuous recog-
nition experiment. Participants experience a long sequence of pictures.
Their task is to detect occasional repeated pictures. The variable “lag”
measures the difference in position between the two presentations of the
repeated picture. b. Cartoon representing a composite memory repre-
sentation. Traces of more recent items (alligator) are more prominent
than the traces of less recent items (clock). c. Cartoon representing a
compressed timeline. This form of representation contains information
about the order in which items were experienced. Because the timeline
is ordered it can be serially scanned starting at the present (alligator)
and going back through the past. The foreshortening of the image is
intended to suggest compression.
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1973; Murdock, 1982; Shiffrin et al., 1993). A composite memory store can account
for the recency effect if the features of items experienced further in the past are stored
with less fidelity than items experienced more recently (Figure 3·1b). In contrast to
the “bag of features” of a composite memory, another class of models proposes that
features are stored along a timeline of experience (Figure 3·1c; G. D. A. Brown et
al., 2007; Murdock, 1974; Howard et al., 2015). As an analogy, the memory store
behaves like a conveyor belt that recedes into the past (Murdock, 1974). As each
item is presented, it is placed at the front of the belt; previously-stored items shift
back towards the past.1 Both frameworks can accommodate the sub-linear increase
in RTs with lag. A composite memory can account for the sub-linear increase if the
strength of the match between a probe and the contents of memory decreases ap-
propriately and this strength is coupled with a model of information accumulation
(e.g., S. Brown & Heathcote, 2005; Ratcliff, 1978; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Infor-
mation along a timeline can be sequentially accessed during memory search, which
terminates when a match to the probe is found. Critically, if this timeline is com-
pressed into a logarithmic scale (G. D. A. Brown et al., 2007; Chater & Brown, 2008;
Shankar & Howard, 2013; Howard et al., 2015), then a logarithmic increase in RT
with lag naturally results from this self-terminating search. On a logarithmic scale
the difference between lag 1 and lag 2 is larger than the difference between lag 100
and lag 101. Rather, the difference between 1 and 2 is equivalent to the difference
between 100 and 200. This property naturally results in a sublinear increase in RT
for probes experienced further in the past.
While these two models cannot be distinguished based on RT alone, they make
very different predictions regarding the shape of the RT distributions (Figure 3·2).
1In this study time per se and number of intervening items are confounded so I will not attempt
to disentangle them.
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Because all of the traces are stored together in a single composite representation
(Figure 3·2a), the time needed to access a composite memory should be the same
regardless of how far in the past the probe was experienced. However, the strength of
that match should depend on the probe’s recency. This is analogous to changing the
drift rate in a drift diffusion process with increasing lag (Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012a;
Ratcliff, 1978). A composite memory representation suggests a parallel access model
in which the RT distributions rise from zero at the same time but differ systematically
in the tail of the distribution as a function of recency. If memories are aligned along a
timeline very different qualitative predictions are possible. If the timeline is accessed
via a self-terminating serial scan, then the time it takes to access the right memory
should depend on the recency of the probe stimulus. Thus this kind of sequential
access model results in RT distributions that start at different times (Figure 3·2b).
Although the rate of information accumulation may also depend on lag in a scanning
model, a change in the time to initiate the search with lag is a distinctive prediction
of a scanning model.
To the best of my knowledge, a systematic change in the time to initiate the
memory search has not been observed in continuous recognition. The main issue in
continuous recognition is that as lag increases, accuracy decreases (Hockley, 1982;
Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961), making it more difficult to measure the effect of
recency on retrieval dynamics independently of changes in accuracy. Brady, Konkle,
Alvarez, and Oliva (2008) showed participants hundreds of memorable images in a
continuous recognition task with lags varying over more than two orders of magnitude,
with lags from 1 (no intervening items) to 128. Because the pictures were highly
memorable, there was little variability in accuracy, even at very long lags. In addition
the RT data are minimally affected by sequential dependencies, which are known
to affect RTs in recognition memory (Malmberg & Annis, 2012). Because of the
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use of highly memorable pictures, wide range of lags tested, and the elimination of
sequential dependencies, the Brady et al. (2008) is well-suited to study the effect of
recency on RT distributions. This paper analyzes the RT data collected during the
Brady et al. (2008) task (referred to as Experiment 1) and replicated the basic finding
twice. Experiment 2 was a straightforward replication; In Experiment 3 a visual mask
separated the images and studied a wider range of lags.
3.1 Materials and Methods
I analyzed the data collected as a part of the repeat detection task in the visual
long term memory experiment conducted by Brady et al. (2008) using mTurk (Ex-
periment 1) and two in-lab replications of the same task (Experiments 2 & 3). The
main difference between Experiments 2 & 3 is that a mask was used to separate the
images and added repetitions at longer longs in Experiment 3. Categorically dis-
tinct images were obtained from a commercially available database (Hemera Photo-
Objects,Vol. I and II) and through internet searches using Google Image Search.
Examples of the images are used in Figure 3·1. The images (subtending approxi-
mately 7.5◦ by 7.5◦ of visual angle) were presented one at a time at the center of the
screen. Participants were required to respond to repeated images but not required to
respond “no” to new items. The sequence of presentations did not include successive
repetitions. As a result, sequential responses were only made when a repetition was
followed by a false alarm or vice versa. Because the false alarm rate was very low,
this was quite rare.
Lag was defined as the difference between the position of a repetition and the
previous presentation of that stimulus; immediate repetition thus corresponds to a
lag of 1. In Experiment 1, memory for repeated pictures that were presented within
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Figure 3·2: Distinguishing the two forms of memory represen-
tation. a. A composite memory implies that the items are accessed
in parallel. The rate of information accumulation is higher for more
recent probes and the time to start accessing the memory of the probe
item does not depend on its lag. Thus a parallel access hypothesis re-
sults in RT distributions that rise at about the same time but show
systematically longer tails as the probe becomes less recent. This trend
can be seen readily in cumulative RT plots (right). b. A timeline can
accommodate a self-terminating scanning hypothesis. Under this hy-
pothesis, more recent probes do not differ in their rate of information
accumulation, but rather the time at which information starts to ac-
cumulate. Thus a scanning hypothesis results in RT distributions that
rise at different times but maintain the same shape.
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the same block at lags from 1 to 128 was analyzed.2 The way the experiment was
constructed, repetitions at longer lags were somewhat less likely than repetitions at
shorter lags. The average number of observations per participant included in the main
analyses ranged from 27 at lag 1 to 9 at lag 128 for Experiment 1. In Experiment 2 the
average number of observations per participant varied from 30 at lag 1 to 16 at lag 128
and in Experiment 3 the average number of observations per participant varied from
30 at lag 1 to 12 at lag 512.
There is strong evidence suggesting that the time to access immediate repetitions
is very different from the time to access repetitions after intervening stimuli, (e.g.,
McElree & Dosher, 1989). In order to ensure that the findings were not driven by
immediate repetitions, lag 1 was excluded from the analyses. Noting the sublinear
effect of lag on RT, statistical analyses on the base 2 logarithm of lag is performed.
That is, for the purpose of statistical analyses lags 2, 4, 8, 16 . . . are given values
1, 2, 3, 4 . . . . This means that when a regression coefficient is reported for lag,
it is interpretable as the change associated with doubling of lag. For simplicity of
exposition, in some cases it will not explicitly state “base 2 log of lag” but simply
refer to “lag” in describing statistical analyses.
Some of the images were repeated multiple times during the course of the exper-
iment. Only the first repetitions are included in the first round of analyses. Second
repetitions are analyzed later in the subsection entitled “Analysis of second repeti-
tions”. The specific differences between the three experiments are listed below.
3.1.1 Experiment 1
The accuracy data from Experiment 1 were originally reported in Brady et al. (2008),
which provides a detailed description of the methods. During this task a total of 2896
2Lag 256 was excluded in Experiment 1, which was repeated fewer than 5 times per participant.
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images (2,500 new and 396 repeated images) were shown to 14 participants across 10
study blocks of approximately 20 minutes each. The images were presented for 3 s
each, followed by an 800 ms fixation cross.
3.1.2 Experiment 2 & 3
Experiments 2 and 3 were implemented in PyEPL (Geller, Schlefer, Sederberg, Ja-
cobs, & Kahana, 2007). Participants from Boston University were recruited for one
session each and were paid $15 per hour for their time. In Experiment 2, a total of
900 images (650 new and 250 repeated images) were shown to 35 participants across
2 study blocks of approximately 20 minutes each. In Experiment 3, a total of 1360
images (1084 new and 276 repeated images) were shown to 39 participants across 2
study blocks of approximately 35 minutes each. The images were presented for 2.6 s
each, followed by a 400 ms of cross for Experiment 2. In Experiment 3 the images
were separated by phase scrambled images as masked separators instead of the cross.
3.1.3 Model fitting
In addition to standard distributional measures, RT distributions were also charac-
terized using the shifted Wald distribution. The shifted Wald distribution gives the
finishing times for a drift diffusion process (Wald, 1947) with one absorbing bound-
ary. This is appropriate for this dataset because the participants only provided “yes”
responses. The density function of the shifted Wald distribution is described by three
parameters, µ, λ, and σ and is given by:
f(t;µ, λ, σ) =
λ
2pi (t− σ)3 exp−
{λ− µ (t− σ)}2
2 (t− σ) (3.1)
The parameter µ describes the rate of information accumulation, i.e., the drift rate.
The parameter λ describes the distance of the boundary from the starting point of
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the diffusion process and σ describes the non-decision time before information begins
to accumulate.
To determine if there was a significant effect of the time at which information
accumulation begins, I considered a model where σ and µ were allowed to vary freely
as a function of lag.3 Since three parameters are being fit per participant for each
lag, only the subjects who had at least four correct responses per lag are included.
All participants in Experiments 1 and 2 met this threshold. In Experiment 3, this
cut-off was met by 32 out of 39 participants.
Log likelihood of each response was computed using the analytic expression in
Eq. 3.1 for each participant assuming responses are independent. The optimization
function tried to minimize the negative log likelihood of the data given the parameters
varying for each model using the Nelder-Mead algorithm. To avoid local minima, each
parameter optimization was run from multiple starting points and the parameters
from one iteration were passed back to the optimizer until the parameter values
stopped changing.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 There was a recency effect on accuracy, but hit rate remained high
at all lags
In all three experiments, accuracy decreased with increasing lag, but remained quite
high (Figure 3·3a). In Experiment 1, the overall hit rate was .95, compared to a false
alarm rate (incorrect detection of new images) of .01, corresponding to a d′ of about
4. Hit rate decreased with lag; at lag 128, the hit rate was .89 corresponding to a d′
of about 3.5. In Experiment 2, the overall hit rate was .89 and the false alarm rate
3Note that it is not sensible to allow boundary separation to vary as a function of recency—
this would require that the participant know the recency of the probe before information begins to
accumulate.
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Figure 3·3: Empirical findings from the task a. Hit Rate as a
function of lag on log2 paper for Experiments 1, 2, and 3. The hit rate
goes down with lag. There appears to be a more pronounced drop in
the hit rate at higher lags. b. Median response time as a function of lag
on log2 paper. Median response time increased approximately linearly
with the logarithm of lag. c. The 1st decile as a function of lag on log2
paper. Error bars in all figures represent the 95% confidence interval
of the mean across participants normalized using the method described
in Morey (2008).
was .03, corresponding to a d′ of about 3. The hit rate varied from 0.96 (d′ = 3.57)
for immediate repetitions to .69 (d′ = 2.3) for a lag of 128. In Experiment 3 the
overall hit rate was .81 and the false alarm rate was .03, corresponding to a d′ of
about 2.8. The hit rate for a lag 1 was 0.92 (d′ = 3.28) and dropped to 0.57 (d′ = 1.9)
for lag 512. Overall, the base 2 logarithm of lag was a significant predictor of the hit
rate, across the three experiments (see slope of Hit rates in Table 3.1). This drop in
hit rate seemed to accelerate at longer lags.
3.2.2 Non-parametric measures of RT distributions showed that more
recent memories were accessed more quickly
The median RT increased as a function of (base 2 logarithm of) lag in all three
experiments (Figure 3·3b). Allowing for independent intercepts for each participant
using linear mixed effects model, it was found that lag was a significant predictor of
the median response time across Experiment 1, 2 & 3 (Table 3.1).
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A serial self-terminating model predicts RT distributions that change systemat-
ically with lag in terms of their starting positions (Figure 3·2b). This implies that
the difference due to lag should be observable at the earliest parts of the distribution.
Examination of the cumulative RT distributions (Figure 3·4) appeared to show a sys-
tematic change in the starting position of the distributions as a function of lag across
all three experiments. In order to quantify this visual impression, I analyzed the 1st
decile of the response time distribution. Across the three experiments, the slope of
the 1st decile was significant. Notably, the slope of the 1st decile was comparable over
the three experiments, with overlapping confidence intervals in Experiments 1 & 3.
The value of the slope indicates that each doubling of lag resulted in a shift of about
20 ms in the distribution.
3.2.3 Model-based analyses of RT distributions showed that more recent
memories were accessed more quickly
The model-based analyses of RT distributions confirmed the impression from non-
parametric statistics that the RT distributions shifted with increasing lag. Figure 3·5
summarizes the results for the shift and drift parameters of the shifted Wald distribu-
tion; statistics are shown in Table 3.1. To summarize the results, the shift parameter
showed a consistent effect of lag across all three experiments. The intercept for the
shift parameter, about 400 ms, was similar for the three experiments despite large
changes in median RT. All three experiments showed reliable slopes demonstrating
that the shift parameter σ changed systematically as a function of lag. The regression
coefficients were similar for the three experiments (the confidence intervals for Exper-
iments 1 and 3 overlapped); each doubling of lag shifted the time to access memory
by about 15-20 ms.
To assess the effect of lag on µ in similar units, λ divided by µ was taken as
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Figure 3·4: Time to access memory changed systematically
with lag in all three experiments. a. Unsmoothed across-
participant cumulative response distributions for each lag. Shorter lags
are darker shades. Note that the cumulative distributions shift with
decreasing recency. The three panels are Experiments 1-3 (top to bot-
tom). Compare to Figure 3·2 (right). b. Inset to make the shift more
readily apparent.
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Figure 3·4: Time to access memory changed systematically
with lag in all three experiments. a. Unsmoothed across-
participant cumulative response distributions for each lag. Shorter lags
are darker shades. Note that the cumulative distributions shift with
decreasing recency. The three panels are Experiments 1-3 (top to bot-
tom). Compare to Figure 3·2 (right). b. Inset to make the shift more
readily apparent.
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Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Hit Rate Intercept 1.02± 0.01 0.99± 0.02 0.99± 0.02
t(83) = 82.12∗∗ t(209) = 48.64∗∗ t(255) = 43.89∗∗
Slope −0.014± 0.002 −0.032± 0.003 −0.045± 0.002
t(83) = −6.46∗∗ t(209) = −11.46∗∗ t(255) = −18.62∗∗
Median Intercept 0.93± 0.04 0.58± 0.01 0.598± 0.02
t(83) = 22.22∗∗ t(209) = 43.87∗∗ t(255) = 30.61∗∗
Slope 0.013± 0.003 0.021± 0.002 0.032± 0.002
t(83) = 4.54∗∗ t(209) = 13.27∗∗ t(255) = 17.52∗∗
1st decile Intercept 0.73± 0.03 0.493± 0.008 0.52± 0.01
t(83) = 22.05∗∗ t(209) = 59.28∗∗ t(255) = 37.43∗∗
Slope 0.023± 0.002 0.017± 0.001 0.022± 0.001
t(83) = 9.29∗∗ t(209) = 15.21∗∗ t(255) = 17.65∗∗
Shift Intercept 0.37± 0.06 0.394± 0.009 0.41± 0.01
t(83) = 6.72∗∗ t(209) = 42.21∗∗ t(255) = 33∗∗
Slope 0.022± 0.003 0.015± 0.001 0.019± 0.002
t(83) = 6.66∗∗ t(209) = 13.28∗∗ t(255) = 12.67∗∗
Drift Intercept 0.57± 0.07 0.23± 0.02 0.25± 0.02
t(83) = 7.91∗∗ t(209) = 14.74∗∗ t(255) = 11.41∗∗
Slope −0.003± 0.005 0.011± 0.002 0.014± 0.002
t(83) = −0.72, ns t(209) = 4.46∗∗ t(255) = 6.23∗∗
Shift- Intercept 0.36± 0.06 0.401± 0.009 0.43± 0.01
till lag 32 t(55) = 6.57∗∗ t(139) = 44.2∗∗ t(127) = 40.35∗∗
Slope 0.024± 0.005 0.012± 0.002 0.011± 0.002
t(55) = 5.15∗∗ t(139) = 7.79∗∗ t(127) = 5.14∗∗
Drift- Intercept 0.59± 0.07 0.24± 0.02 0.28± 0.02
till lag 32 t(55) = 8.23∗∗ t(139) = 14.89∗∗ t(127) = 12.16∗∗
Slope −0.011± 0.006 0.004± 0.003 0± 0.004
t(55) = −1.94 t(139) = 1.37 t(127) = 0.06
Table 3.1: The slopes and intercepts of the empirical and model fits
across the three experiments. Statistical tests were done on the base 2
logarithm of lag; regression coefficients with respect to lag are under-
standable as the rate per doubling of lag. Effects significant at p < 0.001
are indicated by ∗∗.
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Figure 3·5: The time to access memory, estimated by the shift
parameter of the Wald distribution, changed systematically
with lag and was consistent across the three experiments. a.
The shift parameter of the Wald distribution as a function of lag on
log2 paper for the three experiments. b. The drift parameter of the
Wald distribution as a function of lag across the three experiments.
a dependent measure. The drift rate µ is in units of evidence per unit time. The
boundary separation λ is in units of evidence. λ/µ thus has units of time, making it
directly comparable to σ. In contrast the drift parameter µ did not show a consistent
trend across experiments (see Figure 3·5).
Qualitatively, it seems that the drift parameter did not change reliably at relatively
short lags. In order to assess this, noting that lag 32 was the point at which hit rate
began to fall off more abruptly (Fig. 3·3a), statistics for shift and drift for lags 2-32
were recomputed. The results are in Table 3.1. Over this range of lags, the shift
parameter still showed a reliable linear trend, whereas the drift parameter did not.
Moreover, the confidence intervals for the regression coefficients did not overlap in
any of the three experiments, demonstrating that for lags from 2 to 32 there was a
differential effect of recency on the shift parameter vs the drift parameter. Over this
range of lags, corresponding to delays of up to about a minute and a half, the effect
of recency was solely carried by the shift parameter.
There is converging evidence in favor of a systematic change in the non-decision
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time with lag from the model based analyses. The shift parameter has a significant
slope across the three experiments. Thus the evidence from non-parametric analyses
and model-based analyses strongly support the hypothesis that the time necessary to
access visual memories changes with recency.
3.2.4 Analysis of second repetitions argued against a non-scanning ac-
count of the results
Analysis of the first repetitions showed evidence that recency affects RT distributions
via a shift in the distribution, consistent with a change in the time to access memory
as predicted by a self-terminating search model. While a shift in the RT distribution
is consistent with a serial self-terminating search during the memory comparison
phase, this is not the only possible explanation. Presumably, the probe must be
encoded before it can be compared to memory. The shift in the RT distributions is
also consistent with the hypothesis that encoding of recently-experienced probes is
facilitated but that there is no effect of recency on the memory-comparison stage per
se (Sternberg, 1969a).
If the recency of a repeated item allows it to be processed faster as a probe, then
repeating the item again should have an additional effect on RT. Thus far I have
examined RTs to the first repetition (second presentation) of the probe stimulus. In
order to evaluate the hypothesis that the recency effect was attributable to processing
fluency, RTs to the second repetition (third overall presentation) were examined. If
changes in RTs were being driven by greater facility of processing of recently-presented
probes, then the lags of the two presentations ought to both affect RT. In contrast, if
the changes in RT are driven by a self-terminating scanning model during the memory
comparison stage, then only the most recent lag should affect RT. Scanning further
predicts that the effect of the most recent lag should be the same on both the first
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and second presentations and that in both cases the effect of lag should be to cause a
shift of the RT distribution. All three of the predictions of a self-terminating scanning
model held across all three experiments.
Accuracy was very high for probes that were repeated a second time. In Experi-
ment 1, 49 images that were repeated a second time and the overall hit rate for the
second repetitions was 0.99±0.006. In Experiments 2 and 3, 54 images were presented
a third time and the overall hit rates were 0.98± 0.01 and 0.96± 0.01 respectively.
Only the most recent lag affected RT on second repetitions
There are two lags associated with the third presentation of a probe. Let us refer
to the lag between the first and second presentation as lag1 and the lag between
the second and third presentation as lag2, so that at the third presentation lag2 is
the most recent lag. Allowing each participant to have an independent intercept (to
account for between participant variability) in a linear mixed effects model using the
base 2 logarithm of the two lags as regressors, there were reliable effects of lag2 but no
effect of lag1 in all three experiments. In Experiment 1 lag2 showed a reliable effect,
.016± .005, t(600) = 3.39, p < .01; but no effect of lag1, −.003± .005, t(600) = −.60.
In Experiment 2, lag2 showed a reliable effect, .012 ± .003, t(1812) = 3.84, p < .01,
but lag1 did not, −.001 ± .003, t(1812) = .02. In Experiment 3, the same pattern
held, lag2: .015± .004, t(1623) = 3.44, p < .01; lag1, −.007± .005, t(1623) = 1.5.
The effect of lag on RT was the same for first and second repetitions
In the analysis shown above, RT to images repeated a third time depended on the most
recent lag (second repetition) and did not depend on the lag to the first repetition. A
scanning model predicts further that the effect of lag2 on the second repetition should
be the same as the effect of lag on the initial repetition. Figure 3·6a-c summarize
47
a b c d
l l l l
l l
l
Experiment 1
Lag
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
 
2 4 8 16 32 64 128
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
Rep once
Rep twice
l
l
l
Experiment 2
Lag
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
 
2 4 16
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1 Rep once
Rep twice
l l
l
Experiment 3
Lag
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
 
2 4 16
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1 Rep once
Rep twice
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
1st Decile by Lag
Lag
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(s)
 
2 4 16
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
Exp 1
Exp 2
Exp 3
Figure 3·6: The effect of lag on RT was the same for first and
second repetitions. a-c. Median response time as a function of the
most recent lag for first (solid) and second (repetitions) for the three
experiments. To the extent the lines are parallel, it means that the effect
of recency on RT was the same on the first and second presentations.
Analyses reported in the text demonstrated that only the most recent
lag affected the RT of old probes repeated twice. d. The 1st decile of
the second repetitions as a function of lag on log2 paper. The results
are comparable to those for first repetitions (Fig. 3·3c). Distributions
for second repetitions are shown in Fig. 3·7.
these comparisons. Across all three experiments, plots of RT as a function of lag
(lag2 for repeated stimuli) showed parallel curves for first and second repetitions on
log2 paper. This visual impression was confirmed by a multiple regression with lag,
repetition and an interaction term of lag and repetition. In all the three experiments,
there was a significant effect of lag and repetition but the interaction term was not
significant (statistics are in Table 3.2).
RT distributions shifted as a function of recency on second repetitions
A scanning account predicts that the effect of lag on second repetitions should not
only be of a similar magnitude as the effect of lag on first repetitions, but that in
both cases the effect should be associated with a shift in the distributions. Figure 3·7
shows the cumulative RT distributions for second repetitions for different lags. As
in the initial repetitions (Fig. 3·4), the RT distributions appeared to shift with lag.
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Figure 3·7: For probes repeated a second time, the most recent
lag a↵ected the time to access memory. Unsmoothed across-
participant cumulative response distributions for second repetitions are
shown for the most recent lag. Shorter lags are darker shades. The inset
zooms in on the time at which the distributions start rising from 0. a.
Experiment 1. b. Experiment 2. c. Experiment 3.
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Exp Lag Repetition Interaction
1 0.013± 0.004 −0.07± 0.02 0.004± 0.005
t(179) = 3.47∗∗ t(179) = −2.96∗ t(179) = 0.84
2 0.013± 0.002 −0.068± 0.009 −0.004± 0.004
t(172) = 5.33∗∗ t(172) = −7.31∗ t(172) = −1.02
3 0.010± 0.002 −0.08± 0.01 −0.003± 0.004
t(57) = 3.78∗∗ t(157) = −7.96∗ t(157) = 0.75
Table 3.2: The RTs to second repetitions are faster than to first
repetitions but both repetitions show the same effect of lag. Results of
a multiple regression analysis with (base 2 logarithm of) lag, repetition
and their interaction. See also Figure 3·6a-c. Effects significant at
p < 0.001 are indicated by ∗∗ and at p < 0.01 are indicated by ∗.
This visual impression was confirmed by non-parametric analysis.4 Figure 3·6d shows
the 1st decile of the RT distributions as a function of lag for all three experiments. A
regression of the 1st decile of the RT for the second repetitions onto lag was significant
across the three experiments (Exp. 1: 0.015 ± 0.003 ,t(83) = 4.5, p < 0.001; Exp. 2:
0.010± 0.001, t(69) = 6.9, p < 0.001; Exp. 3: 0.012± 0.002, t(63) = 5.08, p < 0.001).
To summarize, while there was an effect of the lag to the most recent presentation
of the probe stimulus, there was no additional effect of its prior presentation. The
response time distributions for the second repetitions show a systematic change in
the time at which cumulative distributions rise from zero and the effect of multiple
repetitions manifests itself in the intercept term of the response time vs. lag line.
These observations fail to provide any evidence for the hypothesis that the effect of
recency on RT was due to a facilitation of probe encoding. In contrast, these findings
are exactly as one would have predicted if the effect of recency on RT was caused by
serial self-terminating scanning of a compressed representation of the past.
4Because the number of responses per lag to second repetitions was relatively small, model-based
analyses of second repetitions were not attempted.
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3.3 Discussion
It has long been known that response time in a continuous recognition experiment
increases with the lag to the probe. If memory search requires scanning of a timeline
to find the appropriate memory, then the increase in RT should be associated with a
shift in the distribution. Three experiments showed that lag consistently shifted RT
distributions. This effect was observable both using non-parametric analyses of RT
distributions (Fig. 3·4) as well as a model-based analysis (Fig. 3·5). Consistent with
the scanning account, RTs to second repetitions depended only the most recent lag, as
if the search terminated when the first match is found. Although RTs were faster to
second repetitions overall, the effect of the most recent lag on second repetition RTs
was the same as the effect of lag on first presentation RTs (Fig. 3·6a-c). This effect
on second repetitions was manifest as a shift of the RT distributions (Fig. 3·7). The
overall change in RT for second repetitions could be explained by a probe processing
fluency account.
Consistent with earlier findings (e.g., Hockley, 1982) the results of these experi-
ments showed a sublinear shift with lag. The results of this paper are roughly con-
sistent with a logarithmic increase in RT as a function of lag; each doubling of lag
resulted in a shift of approximately 15-20 ms in the RT distribution. A continuous
shift in RT distributions from lags covering a few seconds up to lags of more than
20 minutes was observed. The results of this study are consistent with scanning along
a logarithmically-compressed timeline.
There is extensive evidence for self-terminating serial search models in short-term
memory tasks (Hacker, 1980; Hockley, 1984; McElree & Dosher, 1993; Sternberg,
2016). There is also evidence consistent with scanning along a timeline in JOR
tasks over longer time scales (Hintzman, 2010). However, most previous studies of
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item recognition have found evidence for parallel access to memory, not sequential
scanning, in study-test recognition (Nosofsky et al., 2011; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976;
McElree & Dosher, 1989; Hockley, 1984; Nosofsky et al., 2014). Several potentially
important methodological differences may account for the discrepancy between those
studies and the results in this paper. This experiment used continuous recognition
rather than the study-test procedure (Nosofsky et al., 2011; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976;
McElree & Dosher, 1989; Hockley, 1984; Nosofsky et al., 2014) and highly memorable
trial-unique visual stimuli. In addition, this study only required positive responses to
repeated stimuli and more recent lags were tested more frequently than more remote
lags. The question of which combination of these methodological differences accounts
for the evidence for serial scanning is an extremely important one that merits further
investigation. It is worth noting that there is no reason in principle that a compressed
timeline could not be accessed in parallel (Howard et al., 2015), whereas it is not clear
how (or why) a composite representation could be scanned in a recognition memory
task. Notably, if a logarithmically-compressed timeline is accessed in parallel, the
recency effect for strength of match would fall off like a power law (Howard et al.,
2015), much like the change Donkin and Nosofsky (2012a) observed experimentally
in drift rate.
On its face, serial scanning of a compressed timeline requires a more elaborate
memory representation than a simple composite memory. However, it also suggests a
deep analogy between search through memory and directed attention along percep-
tual dimensions. Neural receptive fields in vision form a compressed representation of
retinal space, with broader receptive fields at locations further from the fovea (Hubel
& Wiesel, 1974; E. L. Schwartz, 1977). By analogy, “time cells” in the hippocampus
(MacDonald, Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum, 2011), prefrontal cortex (Tiganj, Kim,
Jung, & Howard, in press) and striatum (Mello, Soares, & Paton, 2015) can be under-
52
stood as constructing a compressed timeline. Attention can be strategically deployed
to sensory dimensions resulting in preferential access to information available along
those dimensions (e.g., Teder-Sa¨leja¨rvi, Mu¨nte, Sperlich, & Hillyard, 1999; Shomstein
& Yantis, 2004). To the extent both perception and memory make use of the same
form of compressed neural representation, scanning in memory can be understood as
exploiting the same kind of computational mechanisms used to direct visual attention.
53
Chapter 4
Judgment of Imminence: Retrieval
dynamics of the future are similar to
retrieval dynamics of the past
4.1 Introduction
“Memory is the association of a present image with others known to belong
to the past. Expectation the same, with future substituted for past.”
(William James - Principles of Psychology, 1890)
The ability to predict the future underlies a wide variety of cognitive tasks. For
instance, in major league baseball, the ball can travel the 60 ft and 6 in from the
pitcher to the batter in as little as half a second. During this time the batter needs
to be able to predict where the ball is expected and decide whether to swing or not
based on a wide variety of variables. An outfielder has a similar set of predictions to
make about the future state of the ball and has to position himself over the course of
a few seconds. The grounds keepers too need to make predictions in order to to their
job effectively and their decisions rest on being able to imagine the future states of
the ballpark on the order of many days.
These cognitive tasks illustrate two fundamental constraints on our ability to
predict the future. First, in all cases, it is not sufficient to know what will occur, but
also when. For instance, if the batter predicts perfectly where the ball will cross the
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plate, but unsuccessfully predicts when it will cross the plate, a foul ball is likely to
result.1 Similarly, if the grounds crew knows it will rain 2 cm over the next week, but
does not know what day, they may end up delivering too much or too little water to
the grass. Second, the precision required for the prediction depends on how far in the
future one is trying to predict. An error of 100 ms would be disastrous to the batter
but irrelevant to the grounds crew. This is not only analogous to the decrease in
temporal precision for our memory for the past (Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968; Yntema
& Trask, 1963), but also the decrease in the precision of perception illustrated by
the Weber-Fechner law (Fechner, 1860/1912). These two concerns suggest that the
brain: 1) maintains information about when future stimuli will occur, organizing
future events along a timeline and 2) this representation is compressed, such that it
conveys information about future time points with decreasing accuracy.
We have seen evidence suggesting that both of these properties hold for memory
for the past. In Chapter 2 the response times for correct responses in a Judgment of
Recency task varied as a function of the lag to to the more recent item and did not
depend on the lag to the less recent item. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the brain maintains information about the past in a representation that is temporally
organized. Further the response time varied sub-linearly with lag to the more recent
item suggesting a compressed representation. Chapter 3 reported the results from a
continuous recognition paradigm. The key finding that the time take by participants
to initiate a response varies as a function of the logarithm of the lag which is also
consistent with a compressed representation of the past.
Many authors have hypothesized a deep symmetry between the ability to remem-
ber the past and imagine the future. In episodic memory in particular, the ability to
1The authors are aware that hitting a round ball with a round bat squarely is much more com-
plicated than this.
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remember episodes from the past has been linked to the ability to simulate the future
(Tulving, 1985). Recent findings from neuroimaging studies have found some support
for this view (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Bar, 2009) Deficits in the abil-
ity to predict the future are known to be comorbid with deficits in episodic memory
due to aging (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008) and neurological insults (Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Some authors have even argued that optimal
prediction could indeed be the guiding principle underlying the functional organiza-
tion of the brain (Friston, 2010; Bialek, 2012; Palmer, Marre, Berry, & Bialek, 2015).
Recent modeling work has extended a scale-invariant representation of the past to
support a mechanism of accessing future states thereby suggesting a deep symmetry
between the representations that support memory of the past and predictions about
the future (Shankar et al., 2016).
While many authors have suggested a symmetry between the mechanisms that
allow us to access the past and the future, there is a dearth of behavioral paradigms
that allow one to directly compare memory access for past and future events under
controlled laboratory conditions. The judgment of recency (JOR) task requires the
participant to compare the relative order of two items from a past list. A symmetry
between the past and the future would predict that a relative order judgment task on
future events should also show the properties consistent with scanning of a compressed
representation (Chapter 2). A new Judgment of Imminence (JOI) paradigm was
developed to test this hypothesis. The task is analogous to the JOR task; by studying
the effect of the more and the less recent lags on response times the memory access
for prospective and retrospective memory can directly be compared.
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Figure 4·1: Schematic of the judgment of imminence (JOI)
task. a. The participants are shown letters that are drawn from a
probabilistic sequence where the next item in the sequence is shown
with a probability of 0.9 and with a probability of 0.1 any other item
in the list is shown and so on. b. After a short training round, the
participants are shown probes in addition to the letters drawn from
the sequence. The probe consists of two non adjacent letters from the
sequence and the participants are required to choose the item that is
expected to appear sooner.
4.2 Methods
In order to probe the ability of participants to make relative order judgments of the
future, participants were first trained on a probabilistic sequence. After training,
the participants continued to see the same sequence interspersed with the probes
consisting of two items that were from training. Participants indicated which of the
two items would appear sooner (more imminent).
4.2.1 Sequence generation
For each participant, a unique transition ring similar to the one shown in Figure 4·1a
was generated by randomly selecting 13 consonants. Throughout the duration of the
experiment, the participants saw letters drawn from this ring. With a probability
0.9, the participants saw the next letter in the sequence. With probability 0.1, a
random letter was chosen from the sequence that wasn’t the letter just shown to the
participant. A presentation list of 1550 letters was generated using this procedure
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and this was used presented to the participants one at a time over the course of the
entire experiment from beginning to end. Each letter was displayed on the screen for
1.2 s followed by a fixation cross for .2 s.
4.2.2 Training
During the training round, participants were instructed to repeat each letter silently
to themselves and that they would be tested on this sequence. After sixty letters
were shown to the participants (about 1.5 mins), the initial training round ended
and the experimenter initiated an abbreviated practice round for the actual task
with the relative judgment probes (see below). The sequence continued for about
two minutes. During this time participants were given twenty probes asking them
to make predictions about relative order judgments of the future. The goal of this
task practice round was to show the participants what the final task is so that they
are motivated to pay attention to the sequence. After two minutes of this round, the
training resumed and the participants were shown just the training sequence without
any probes for another three minutes.
4.2.3 Probes
After each letter from the list, a probe was shown with a probability of 0.3. The probe
consisted of two letters that were presented side by side. The participants were told
that they will continue to see the letters one at a time and that sometimes two letters
will be presented side by side. The task was to predict which of the two letters will
appear sooner using the ‘Left’/‘Right’ key. For instance, in Figure 4·1b, Q and K are
presented and the participant is asked to predict which of the two is more imminent.
The correct answer here is Q since it is three steps from the current position in the
sequence vs. K which is five steps in the sequence. The instructions clarified that
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they were not necessarily required to choose the next letter in the sequence (although
that would sometimes be the case) but the one that would appear sooner. Probes
were not shown one after another. At least one letter from the sequence was displayed
before the next probe. If the participants failed to make a response in 4 s, they were
shown a message,“Faster” for 0.2 s and then the task continued. About .013 trials
resulted in a time out. On average the participants were shown 406 probes. The first
10% of the probes (these included the probes shown in training) were omitted from
further analyses. The post-training round lasted for about thirty minutes with two
intermediate breaks.
Based on pilot studies and debriefing interviews, it was found that participants
were particularly cognizant of pairwise associations between the letters in the se-
quence. In order to eliminate an account based on simple pairwise associations be-
tween the probes, I did not present probes that contained stimuli that would be
expected to be presented successively. For instance, in Figure 4·1b, if the more im-
minent item in the probe was X, the less imminent item count not be Q but G or
from further down in the list. The two probe letters were sampled from the next 7
positions in the transition ring using specific combinations for each more imminent
lag. The lag to the more imminent item varied from 1 (next in the sequence) to
5. The points were sampled such that where possible three less imminent lags were
paired with each more imminent lag. For instance, when the more imminent lag was
1 (next item), the less imminent item was chosen from lag positions of 3 , 5, or 7.
When the more imminent lag was 3, the less imminent item was chosen from a lag for
5, 6, or 7. However a more imminent lag of 4 and 6, had two possible pairing options
(lags of 6 and 7) and one possible pairing option (lag 7) respectively
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4.2.4 Participants
Sixty healthy young adults were recruited from Boston University to participate in
one session each and were paid $15 per hour for their time. The study materials
and protocol were approved by the Institutional Review Board at Boston University.
Three participants performed no better than chance; their data was excluded from
further analysis.
4.2.5 Strategy for analyzing the two lag variables
In this task, the probe consists of two items associated with a more and a less im-
minent lag. I am interested in whether either or both of these lags contribute to the
various dependent variables. However due to the nature of this task, the lags are
not sampled equally. For instance a more imminent lag of 4 was only tested with
lags 6 and 7. Moreover the effect of one or more of these variables appears to be
non-linear. Using a straightforward linear model carries the risk of spurious effect
due to residuals from a non-linear and unequally sampled relationship.
In order to control for these effects, the following two step strategy was used.
First the distance effect was quantified by calculating the slopes of the lines joining
the dependent variable as a function of the less salient independent variable. For
instance, in Figure 4·2a, the lines for the correct response time appear to be flat.
Thus the median response time does not appear to depend on the lag to the less
imminent lag. In order to quantify this intuition, the slope of the line joining the
less imminent lags for each more imminent lag was calculated for each participant.
In order to ascertain whether these slopes are meaningfully different from 0 or not, a
Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al., 2009) was performed on the slopes obtained for each
participant. If a particular variable did not contribute to the dependent variable, it
was excluded as a factor in a linear mixed effect analysis. Thus the purpose of this
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Figure 4·2: The response times depend on the more imminent
lag and not on the less imminent lag, thus supporting a serial
prospective memory scanning model. a. Accuracy depends pre-
dominantly on the lag to the more imminent item. b. RT for correct
responses depend strongly on the lag to the more imminent probe. The
slope of the distance effect is not significant. c. The median response
time depends on the lag to the more imminent item.
analysis was simply to ascertain whether a factor meaningfully contributed to the
dependent variable. Once the relevant factors affecting the dependent variable were
ascertained, further analyses were performed with the relevant variables. The function
of the linear mixed effect analysis is simply to determine whether the apparent effect
of the more salient variable is statistically reliable.
4.3 Results
To summarize the results, the accuracy and the response time both depended strongly
on the the lag to the more imminent item. A further characteristic of the correct
response times is that there is a sub-linear effect of lag to the more imminent item
on the response time. Each of these findings is discussed in detail below.
4.3.1 Accuracy depends only on the lag to the more imminent probe
The overall accuracy in this task was .81 ± .02. The accuracy varied from .84 ± .02
when the most imminent lag was 1 to .77 ± .02 when the most imminent lag was 5.
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In order to check if the somewhat upward-sloping lines in Figure 4·2b indicate the
presence of a reliable distance effect, the slopes of each of the lines was calculated
for every participant. A Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al., 2009) on the obtained slopes
revealed “substantial evidence” (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012; Kass & Raftery,
1995; Jeffreys, 1998) favoring the hypothesis that the slopes are not different from 0
(JZS Bayes Factor 6.5).
Thus the accuracy depended on the lag to the more imminent probe alone. The
effects of the more imminent lags on accuracy was quantified using a linear mixed
analysis with independent intercepts for each participant. Accuracy decreased with
an increase in the lag to the more imminent probe by .017 ± .002, t(227) = −6.9,
p < 0.01 per unit change in lag. The finding that participants were more accurate
based on the lag to the more imminent probe is different from the accuracy results
seen in JOR tasks (Hacker, 1980) where accuracy depends on both the more recent
and the less recent lags. The overall accuracy is the JOR task is lower than the
accuracy seen in this task and drops close to chance for the longest lag unlike this
task where the accuracy for the longest lag is reliably above chance.
4.3.2 Correct response time depended strongly on the lag to the more
imminent probe, but not on the lag to the less imminent probe
The response times for the correct responses depended strongly on the more imminent
lag as seen in Figure 4·2a. The response time varied from 1.01 ± .05 s for the most
imminent lag to 1.81 ± .05 s for a lag of five. The lines in Figure 4·2b are relatively
flat which suggests that there isn’t a distance effect. In order to assess this distance
effect more directly, the slopes of lines in Figure 4·2b were calculated separately for
each participant and a Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al., 2009) was performed on the
slopes. This analysis showed “substantial evidence” (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012)
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favoring the hypothesis (JZS Bayes Factor = 9.07) that the slopes are not different
from 0. This suggest that the response time depended prominently on the lag to the
more imminent item.
A linear mixed effects analysis allowing for independent intercepts for each partic-
ipant showed a significant effect of the lag to the more imminent probe, .195± .009 s,
t(227) = 24.1, p < 0.001.
4.3.3 Response time varies sub-linearly with lag to the more imminent
item
Upon visual inspection, Figure 4·2a suggests that the spacing between these lines goes
down as the lag increases. This predicts that the response time seems to get depend
sub-linearly on the lag to the more imminent probe.
In order to test this hypothesis, two models were compared, one where the median
response time was regressed on the lag directly and the other regressed the median
response time onto the logarithm of the more imminent lag. The log model fit better
than the linear model, ∆log likelihood = 32.6 (log model is 1014 times more likely as
compared to the linear model). A linear mixed effects analysis allowing for indepen-
dent intercepts for each participant showed a significant effect of the log2 lag to the
more imminent probe, .34± .01 s, t(227) = 26.5, p < 0.001.
As an additional test, I also ran a separate analysis comparing polynomial fits
to the various powers of the lag to the more imminent item. The quadratic model
provided a better fit than the linear model ∆log likelihood = 26.6 (with a negative
slope of the quadratic term −1.0 ± 0.2, t(226) = −5.7, p < 0.01). The quadratic
model also fit better than other models with higher order polynomials. Thus the
response time appears to be temporally compressed in short term memory. This
result is consistent with the conclusions of the logarithmic analysis reported above.
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Both approaches found evidence that the effect the lag to the more imminent probe
on correct RT was sub-linear, as predicted by a scanning model that scans along a
temporally-compressed representation.
4.3.4 The incorrect response time showed mixed results
When participants make errors, the forward scanning model predicts that the response
time should depend on the lag to the less imminent probe. However this was not
observed in the error responses here, perhaps because accuracy was much higher
than the JOR task in Chapter 3. The overall error rate was .19 ± .02 and for each
participant on average 6 error responses per condition were obtained. To evaluate
whether the more imminent lag contributed to the change in median response times of
a particular less imminent lag (distance effect), the slope across the more imminent
lags for each less imminent lag was calculated . This is analogous to the distance
effect calculation for correct RTs except the distance effect is calculated separately
for the lag to the less imminent probe rather than the more imminent probe. The less
imminent lags of 3 and 4 only have one possible combination so a slope could not be
calculated for these lags. Across the remaining slopes, a Bayesian t-test showed that
the evidence for a distance effect was “barely worth a mention” (JZS Bayes Factor
= 1.1) (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Jeffreys, 1998).
Given the overall error rate of .19, there are less than one fourth the number of
observations for incorrect RTs as there are for correct RTs. While a linear mixed
effects analysis, allowing each participant to have an independent intercept, and both
lags as regressors, showed a significant effect of the lag to the more imminent probe on
the median response time of incorrect responses, .04± .01 s, t(586) = 3.0, p < 0.001,
a linear model with both the more and the less imminent lags did not show any
significant effect of the more or the less imminent lag, .04 ± .02 s, t(641) = 1.8 and
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Figure 4·3: Schematic of the hypothesized underlying repre-
sentation in judgment of imminence (JOI) task. a. During par-
ticipants learn the underlying sequence. Assume the letter ‘N’ was just
presented. The next letters in the sequence are ‘R’, ‘Y’, ‘T’... b. The
results support the hypothesis that the participants can scan across the
metal representation of the letters that will appear in the future. The
spacing between the lines is foreshortened to indicate compression in
the underlying memory representations. The accuracy goes down with
the lag to the more imminent item and this is represented as change in
the strength (smaller sized letters).
.01± .01 s, t(641) = .4 respectively.
4.4 Discussion
The goal of this JOI study was to develop a paradigm for making predictions in
prospective memory that is analogous to relative JOR task used to study the past.
This study found results consistent with the results obtained in a relative JOR task
reported in Chapter 2 and Hacker (1980). The classic finding in the relative JOR
task is that the RTs for correct responses depend on the lag to the more imminent
probe but not on the lag to the less imminent probe. These results are consistent
with scanning models of memory that posit that information is stored in a temporally
organized representation that can be sequentially accessed in order to make a response
(Murdock, 1974). This study found that when asked to make relative order judgments
65
about the future, the response time for the correct responses depends on the lag to the
more imminent item and not the less imminent item. This suggests that analogous
to a temporally ordered representation of the past, a similar representation can also
be built for the future. This representation can be sequentially accessed and the
search terminates when the participant finds the target. This line of argument relies
to a large extent on there being no effect of the lag to the less imminent item. In
Figure 4·2a this manifests as flat lines joining the response times of the less imminent
lags. Under a strength based model, the search process is driven by the strength
of the match of the target and the probe and the response time ought to depend
on both the lags. Using a Bayesian t-test allowed testing directly for the null and
showing evidence supporting a serial self-terminating scan on a temporally ordered
representation instead.
The median RT for correct responses varied as a sublinear function of the lag to
the more imminent probe (Figure 4·2b. This is analogous to the compression observed
in the JOR task (Chapter 2) and also the compression in the long term scanning task
(Chapter 3). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the temporally-
ordered representation of the future is not uniformly spaced but is compressed such
that events further from the present are represented with decreasing accuracy.
In contrast to the JOR study, a reliable distance effect on accuracy was not found.
In the JOI experiment accuracy depended predominantly on the lag to the more
imminent probe and not the less imminent probe. The overall accuracy in the JOI
task was much higher than that in the JOR study. In the the JOR task, accuracy
dropped to chance at the longest lag. In contrast, in the JOI task accuracy was well
above chance even for the longest lag. This could possibly explain why the error RTs
failed to show a reliable effect of either lag in the JOI task. In JOI, the number
of error RTs available per lag condition is much lower that those seen in JOR. In
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addition to these differences, there are other procedural differences between the two
tasks. The participants in the JOI had only a single list to remember throughout
the session. In contrast, in the JOR task participants learned many lists using the
same stimuli over the course of a session. Moreover, participants in the JOR tasks
have a well defined expectation on when the probe will be shown since it is always
presented at the end of the list. In the JOI task however, the probe was presented
probabilistically. This could in part explain the response times in the JOI task are
slower that those in the JOR task (particularly the higher intercept in JOI: 1± .05s
vs. .69± .03 in JOR).
In light of these procedural differences between the JOR task and the JOI task,
the similarity of the core results is even more striking. The overall slope of the
median response time with the log2 lag in JOI and JOR are .34 ± .01 and 24 ± .01.
Despite procedural differences and the presentation rates being an order of magnitude
different across these two paradigms, the scanning rates are comparable.
4.5 Conclusion
This study introduced a novel Judgment of Imminence (JOI) task to study temporal
order judgments for the future. The JOI task closely paralleled the design of the JOR
task, allowing direct comparison. The classic finding in JOR is that the response
time (RT) for correct judgments varies as a function of the distance to the more
recent probe and does not depend on the distance to the less recent probe. This
has suggested to many authors a backward self-terminating search model operating
on a temporally-organized representation of the past. In the JOI task it was found
that correct RT depends on the distance to the more imminent probe and does not
depend on the distance to the less imminent probe. This suggests that a forward self-
terminating search model operating on a temporally-organized representation of the
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future. This result supports the hypothesis that there is a deep symmetry between
the psychological processes that underlie our ability to remember the past and make
predictions about the future.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of the results
Prior work on models of memory has suggested that memories are stored in a rep-
resentation where information is organized by time (G. D. A. Brown et al., 2007;
Shankar & Howard, 2012). A key prediction of such models is the hypothesis that
information can be accessed by means of a serial search (scanning). Results from
three recognition memory studies were presented looking at responses in short-term,
long-term, and prospective memory. In Experiment 1 this hypothesis was explored
using a judgment of recency task over short lists. Experiment 2 looked at responses
in a continuous recognition paradigm with repetitions that spanned minutes. Ex-
periment 3 tested whether the responses in a prospective memory task are similar
to the responses in a judgment of recency task. Across the three experiments, the
response times were found to vary sub-linearly with the lag to the target. This finding
is consistent with the hypothesis that the underlying representation is compressed.
5.1.1 Results from Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, a judgment of recency task was used where participants made a
recency order judgments for two probe items presented at the end of a list. The entire
list (9, 11, or 13 consonants) was presented in about two seconds. The participants
were then shown two letters from this list and asked to indicate which of the two letters
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was presented more recently. The response times for both correct and error responses
depended on the chosen probe item (more recent for correct responses and less recent
for errors). A Bayesian t-test showed positive evidence for a null effect of the lag
to the probe that was not chosen. These two pieces of evidence are consistent with
a serial self-terminating search. Further the increase in correct RT was a sublinear
function of the lag to the more recent probe. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that the underlying representation must be compressed.
5.1.2 Results from Experiment 2
The recency effect is perhaps the most fundamental property of human memory. In
continuous recognition the recency effect manifests as a decrease in accuracy and a
sublinear increase in response time with the lag of a repeated stimulus. This recency
effect can be explained by means of two separate hypotheses about the underlying
representation. The recency effect could have resulted from the gradual weakening of
mnemonic traces. Alternatively, the recency effect could result from a search through
a compressed timeline of recent experience. A mnemonic trace merely stores the
strength associated with each item and can be accessed by means of a parallel search.
A timeline on the other hand, allows for the possibility to sequentially access this
ordered representation. While both these two hypotheses can accommodate the basic
properties of the recency effect on RT, they make very different predictions about the
shape of response time distributions. Using highly-memorable pictures to mitigate
changes in accuracy enabled a detailed examination of the effect of recency on retrieval
dynamics. The recency at which pictures were repeated ranged over two orders of
magnitude across three separate tasks. Analysis of the RT distributions showed that
the time at which memories became accessible changed with the recency of the probe,
as predicted by a serial search model suggesting that visual memories can be accessed
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by sequentially scanning along a compressed representation of the past.
5.1.3 Results from Experiment 3
Several authors have suggested a deep symmetry in neural and psychological processes
that underlie our ability to remember the past and make predictions about the future.
However, there is thus far little quantitative data to suggest that this symmetry holds.
In this study temporal order judgment tasks for the past and for the future were
used. The JOR task from Chapter 2 measured order judgments for the past. A novel
judgment of imminence task was introduced to study temporal order judgments for
the future. Participants were trained on a probabilistic sequence and asked to make
relative order judgments about future events. Because the JOI task closely parallels
the design of the JOR task, the judgments of the past and the future can be directly
compared. The classic finding in JOR is that the response time varies as a function
of the distance to the more recent item and does not depend on the distance to
the less recent item, thus suggesting a serial self-terminating process operating on
a temporally ordered representation of the past. Analogous results in the JOI task
suggest that the participants can scan a representation of the future.
5.2 Implications of these results on models of recognition
memory
One of the earliest models of recognition was based on the signal detection framework.
Strengths derived from separate distributions for old and new items was used to
account for the response probabilities in recognition memory (Egan, 1958; Banks,
1970; Green & Swets, 1966; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966; Murdock, 1965). A key
assumption made in this model was that the items were stored in a representation
in which each item was associated with a strength that varied along a continuum.
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Since then, a lot of progress has been made in models of recognition memory but this
assumption has remained a key attribute of most models of recognition (Murdock,
1982; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1980; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Nosofsky & Palmeri,
1998; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese, 1999; Nosofsky et al., 2011). Critically, when the
information stored in such a representation is accessed, the search process returns a
scalar output based on the match. The value of this scalar output depends on the
memory strength and variations in this strength based on lag, list length, and other
task parameters have been used to explain changes in response times and response
probabilities.
As a part of this work I have presented evidence from behavioral tasks that support
a very different form of memory representation. In this representation the information
in memory is organized by time. A well defined and ordered structure of information
raises the possibility of serial sequential access (scanning). These experiments show
evidence consistent with scanning an ordered representation in short-term memory,
long-term memory, and prospective memory.
Another key finding that is consistent across the three tasks is that this repre-
sentation appears to be compressed. In JOR, JOI, and continuous recognition, the
response times varied as function of the logarithm of the lag. In Chapter 3 the results
from the continuous recognition paradigm show that scanning can be used to access
information seen hundreds of images ago. If the representation grows linearly with
the number of stimuli, the neural resources required to encode this information would
be immense. Hence, compression makes it possible to store more information for the
same amount of neural resources. Compression also makes the information stored
in the representation “fuzzy” which explains the drop in fidelity of the stored infor-
mation at longer lags (Shankar & Howard, 2013). This “fuzzy” memory has a close
correspondence to a scale-invariant memory representation and the Weber-Fechner
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Figure 5·1: An internal representation of ‘what’ happened
‘when’ The results from the three experiments support the hypothe-
sis that memories are stored along an internal timeline. Results from
recognition memory tasks from the past and the novel JOI task are
consistent with hypothesis that this representation can be scanned into
the past and the future.
law. In psychophysics, Weber’s law describes the relationship between a physical
stimulus and it’s internal percept. Various behavioral finding from both humans and
non-human animals are consistent with a scale-invariant representation in memory
(Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Balsam & Gallistel, 2009). Scale invariance is also ob-
served in temporal discrimination tasks in humans (Rakitin et al., 1998; Wearden &
Lejeune, 2008) and animals (Roberts, 1981; Smith, 1968). These findings suggest that
scale invariance is an adaptive response to a world with many time scales (Howard &
Shankar, in press).
While each of the findings in Chapters 2, 3 & 4, in isolation, is not not suffi-
cient to establish that the memories are stored in a scale invariant representation
(Friedman, 1993), it is noteworthy that the results obtained in a variety of tasks in-
cluding those described in this work can be explained by means of the same model
(Howard et al., 2015). A logarithmically compressed memory representation allows
for a unified mechanism of operation across different timescales from seconds in JOR
(Chapter 2) to many minutes (Chapter 3) as well as predictions of the future (Chap-
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ter 4). Figure 5·1, shows a cartoon of the hypothesized internal representation that
stores information about the past and the future in a scale invariant representation.
The data obtained in retrospective and prospective tasks show similar results. This
suggests that there could be a common mechanism to access the representation into
the past and the future (Tulving, 1985; Schacter et al., 2007; Bar, 2009). This is also
supported by the modeling work discussed in Chapter 1 (Shankar et al., 2016).
Our data is consistent with the hypothesis that this common mechanism scans
the representation in either direction. The recency effect, the finding that accu-
racy declines and response times increase with lag, naturally follows from scanning a
compressed representation where the strength of the older items decreases with lag
(indicated by smaller sized letters). As we move around in the world, information is
continuously encoded into a scale invariant representation of the past. At the same
time as the future unfolds, we can continuously update our internal representations of
expected future states. Thus, we spend our waking hours straddling the converging
point between these two representations that we perceive as the present.
5.3 A pilot study on temporal attention
An ordered representation in memory is in some ways analogous to a physical percep-
tual dimension, such as space in vision. This framework offers the theoretical basis to
investigate the application of some well-known behavioral effects in perception and
other cognitive domains to memory research. For instance, given a physical dimen-
sion such as space, attention can be strategically deployed to parts of a visual field
under cognitive control. This deployment of attention has been widely studied using
the Posner task (Posner, 1980). The deployment of spatial attention to items held in
working memory using a retro-cue has been shown to improve both the accuracy and
response time for the detection of a probe (Nobre, Griffin, & Rao, 2007). However,
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the deployment of attention based purely on a temporal cue has, to my knowledge,
not been investigated. If memories are laid along a timeline, and if attention can be
strategically deployed to parts of this timeline, we might expect to see a “temporal
Posner” effect in memory retrieval. Some considerations related to developing this
idea into a working paradigm and a pilot study that may suggest a future direction
is discussed below.
5.3.1 Temporal Posner task for short timescales
The following pilot study was designed to investigate whether attention can be se-
lectively deployed to various parts of a conjunctive memory representation of “what”
happened “when”. The goal of this task is to measure a behavioral change in perfor-
mance on a memory task based on a temporal attention cue. The general procedure
employed for this experiment is to show the participants a sequence of stimuli and
provide them with a cue to orient their attention to a specific part of the list followed
by a memory probe. A facilitation in memory processes due to an attentional cue
might lead to faster mean reaction times.
The participants in the pilot study (n = 15) were presented with a short list of
clustered letters sequentially at a central fixation. This was followed by an atten-
tion cue that indicated the cluster for the subsequent probe using positional cues
such as “begin”, “middle” or “end” (Figure 5·2 a,b). After a short delay, the probe
was presented and the participants were instructed to indicate whether the item was
on the list or not. The cue was either congruent (probability ∼0.8) or incongruent
(probability ∼0.2). During control trials there was no attentional cue. Preliminary
evidence suggests that participants can deploy attention to the cued temporal win-
dow. The response times for the congruent trials are faster than the control trials
(Figure 5·2 c). Also, the incongruent trials are slower than control trials thereby
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replicating the overall pattern of results in the Posner task with spatial deployment
of attention.
Given the demands of the task, the participants might be inclined to devise specific
strategies, e.g. if a temporal positional cue (as described above) is used, a participant
might consider associating each item with the letters in the list during encoding. In
this case the “temporal” deployment of attention will not be separable over and above
the improvement of performance due to simple associations. One possible solution
is to increase the presentation rate of the stimuli thereby making it harder for the
participants to adopt such a strategy. Another possible solution might be to use non-
verbal retro-cues such as a continuously varying hue to indicate the relative time on
the list without giving an explicit label that can be associated with the items. The
goal of this particular pilot was to explore the possibility of temporal deployment
of attention. This task needs careful development to rule out the use of alternative
strategies and make it theoretically sound.
5.3.2 Future directions for the temporal Posner study
Prior work has shown some evidence that there is a change in both the mean and
the tail of the RT distribution for congruent vs. incongrunet trials in the Posner
task (Angela & Dayan, 2005). Mathematical models such as LaBerge (1994) provide
a detailed account of how attention operates by biasing the rate of information. A
model based on a change in the rate of information predicts that the reaction time
distributions should vary in both the time they start from 0 and the width of the
time distribution. Gottlob (2004) found experimental evidence for a direct translation
of reaction time distributions with change in the lag between cue and target onset
(stimulus onset asynchrony) without a systematic change in the overall shape of
the distribution. This result suggests that a mechanism of deploying attention that
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Figure 5·2: Directing attention to short temporal intervals. In
this experiment, the participants are presented a clustered list which
is followed by a retro-cue indicating the temporal cluster of the up-
coming probe. The goal is to test whether participants can use this
cue to direct their attention to a specific part of the list and whether
this improves the performance in terms of accuracy and reaction time
for detection of the probe. a. Schematic of a study test recognition
experiment. Participants experience sequence of clustered letters fol-
lowed by an attentional cue indicating the list position for the probe.
The hypothesis is that participants will respond faster than on con-
trol trials. b. In some cases the cue is not congruent with the actual
list position and the hypothesis is that participants will respond slower
than on control trials. c. Preliminary results from the pilot study show
results consistent with the hypothesis that participants are faster on
congruent trials than control trials and slower on incongruent trials as
compared to control trials.
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is based solely on a change in the rate of information is not sufficient to account
for the data. Analysis of the response time distributions could also help reveal the
underlying mechanism behind the deployment of attention. Various metaphors for the
mechanism behind the deployment of attention in perception have included a spotlight
(Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), a zoom lens (Eriksen & James, 1986) and a filter
that biases the rate of information flow (Cheal, 1997). The RT distributions in the
temporal Posner task can be compared to the RT distributions from the spatial Posner
task. This could provide a more principled means of comparison between attention
deployment in the spatial and the temporal domains than mean RT alone.
Directing attention to temporal intervals over longer time scales
In Chapter 3, the results in a continuous recognition paradigm supported the hy-
pothesis that the internal timeline extends to longer timescales on the order minutes.
The continuous recognition paradigm can be adapted to test whether attention can
be deployed over these longer time scales. The participants would be presented with
a series of images, with some repeated images, at various log spaced lags. In order to
ensure that the participants perform the recognition task and not trivially respond to
the image that follows the attentional cue, a random non repeated image would get an
attentional cue for every cued probe trial. Thus the attentional cue per se would not
indicate whether the subsequent image is a repeat or not and the participants would
be required to perform a recognition task independent of the attention deployment
task. The attentional cues would either be neutral or indicate how far back in the list
the attention must be deployed. Most of these cues would be congruent and a few
would be incongruent. This task proposal is hypothetical and has not been piloted.
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5.4 Internal representations in other domains of cognition
Internal representations have a rich history in cognitive science. The very primordium
of the cognitive revolution was Tolman’s idea that animals build an internal map of
their environment with representations of future states and rewards (Tolman, 1948).
It is notable that Tolman foresaw that while all his experiments were done on rats
running in mazes, the idea of cognitive maps extended to complex human behaviors as
well. He believed that these maps were not just meant for navigation but played a role
in other domains of cognition and allowed for more general computations. Symbolic
manipulations of internal representations have been posited to be the very basis of
higher intelligence and are an organizing principle in cognitive science (Pylyshyn,
1986). In addition to this, scale-invariance has been proposed as a separate organizing
principle in cognition (Chater & Brown, 2008). The results presented in the preceding
chapters support the hypothesis that memories are stored in a scale invariant map
and that this representation can be translated to read out future states. The model
described in Chapter 1 summarizes prior work on a neurally plausible mechanism for
building a scale invariant representation and translating it into the future (Shankar &
Howard, 2012; Shankar et al., 2016). The model was developed primarily as a model
for constructing memory representations but the general principles involved in this
computation have some features that could be shared across other cognitive tasks,
such as navigation and attention. Evidence from neuroimaging studies has shown
that representations of space are maintained by humans in navigation tasks (Spiers
& Barry, 2015). Further these representation are used and operated upon during
goal directed navigation (Sherrill et al., 2013; T. I. Brown et al., 2016). Thus, it
is possible that the computations involved in scanning through an internal timeline
in memory are analogous to scanning through an internal representation of space in
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navigation. The Posner task shows that attention can be deployed to a specific region
in space (Posner, 1980). If it turns out that we can similarly deploy attention in time
(see preliminary results in the pilot study above), it would suggest that a general
mechanism underlies both memory and attention.
Latent learning experiments with rats show that even in the absence of a reward,
rats build up spatial maps of a maze (Tolman, 1948). There is evidence that in deci-
sion making tasks with rewards that participants show evidence of both a model-free
and a model-based learning system (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan,
2011). In a model-free learning system, the task structure is eschewed in favor of
directly storing reinforcement driven choices whereas a model-based learning system
creates an internal representation of the task structure that can simulate future out-
comes. This internal representation allows preplay of future states and estimation of
reward probabilities. In most tasks of future rewards, certain stimuli are associated
with a reward at a specific future time. However it is difficult to study how the future
expectancy of the reward in these tasks continuously unfolds. In the newly developed
JOI task, participants are trained on a sequence and they make explicit predictions
about the relative expectancies of future events. In this task, all future states had the
same “value”. If instead the future states are associated with different rewards, this
task can provide a mechanism of studying the simulation of future value with better
precision. Recent work has shown that participants can estimate the reward-timing
statistics of an environment to determine the level of persistence for each environment
(McGuire & Kable, 2015). This suggests a rich representation of the temporal rela-
tionships among future events. Thus, the properties of the representations that play
a role in model-based learning and simulation of the future, might have something in
common with the properties of the model described in Chapter 1.
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